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INTRODUCTION
Remarkably, the Supreme Court has held that whites who wish to
challenge the constitutionality of affirmative action plans have stand-
ing to do so. In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Con-
tractors v. City ofJacksonville,' the Supreme Court upheld the standing
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank David
Cole, Lisa Heinzerling, Patricia King, Tom Krattenmaker, Elizabeth Patterson, and Mike
Seidman for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this Article. Research for this
Article was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law Center.
1 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993). Cf Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (permitting white
challenge to affirmative action voter apportionment scheme without ever discussing issue
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of non-minority construction contractors to challenge a minority set-
aside program under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. What is remarkable is not that the result reached in the
case was wrong, but that the Court was able to reach that result given
its most recent standing precedents. In previous Terms, the Supreme
Court had taken great pains to infuse prohibitively high standing re-
quirements into the law of justiciability so that it could defer to the
political process for the resolution of contentious social issues. In
Northeastern Florida, however, the Court seemed to sidestep those
precedents precisely so that it could supplant political resolution of
the contentious social issue of affirmative action.
It is often difficult to explain why a court decides, a case the way
that it does. Legal realism has left us with a legacy of skepticism con-
cerning the relevance of doctrine in accounting for case outcomes,
and postmodern extensions of legal realism to social science theories
have generated similar disaffection with most nondoctrinal, social sci-
ence accounts. But the assertion that Supreme Court cases are polit-
ical or result-oriented offers little satisfaction because it does not
explain how judges determine what their political or result-oriented
preferences require of them in particular cases.
In such an analytical environment, one can only offer observa-
tions about decisions and hope that they will resonate with the readers
who evaluate them. The observation that I wish to offer is that the
Supreme Court's decision in Northeastern Florida is racially suspicious.
It is one of a series of racially suspicious decisions that the Supreme
Court has issued concerning the issue of standing. In fact, close ex-
amination suggests that the Supreme Court's standing decisions em-
body the very sort of racial discrimination that we rely on the Court to
prevent.
I have argued in the past that, contrary to popular understand-
ing, the institutional function of the Supreme Court in American cul-
ture has consistently been to facilitate the subordination of racial-
of standing). In order to facilitate the process of finding references, the secondary sources
that are cited most frequently in this Article are collected alphabetically in this foomote:
Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergne Dilemma; in SHADES OF BROWN: NErw PER-
SPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 91 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980); STEPHEN G. BaRy&R &
RIcHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (3d ed. 1992); David
Cole, Neutral Standards and Racist Speech, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 65 (1992); JOHN H. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OFJUDICLAL REVIEW (1980); WILLIAM N. ESRRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. FRicREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY (1988); Louis M. Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAl- L. REv. 673 (1992);
Girardeau A. Spann, ExpositoiyJutic4 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1983) [hereinafter Spann,
Expositoiy Justice]; GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT. THE SUPREME COURT
AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993) [hereinafter SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE
COURT]; GEOFFREY STONE Er AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
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minority interests to white majority interests.2 The array of standing
decisions issued by the Court since the New Deal illustrates this veiled
majoritarian phenomenon. In fact, the racially correlated outcomes
of the cases suggest that if the Supreme Court's racial discrimination
standards were applicable to the Court's treatment of standing, the
Supreme Court's standing decisions would violate its own nondiscrim-
ination norms.
When minority plaintiffs file programmatic challenges to wide-
spread patterns of racial discrimination, the Court typically denies
standing because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a sufficient likeli-
hood of particularized gain resulting from a favorable judgment.
Such a showing is required to establish ajusticiable "case" or "contro-
versy."3 However, when nonminority plaintiffs file similar program-
matic challenges to affirmative action programs, the Court typically
grants standing, even though the plaintiffs are equally unable to
demonstrate a high likelihood of particularized gain.
The distinctions that the Court offers to justify this racially dispa-
rate treatment are too tenuous to survive the level of scrutiny that the
Court applies to nongovernmental actors under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.4 Moreover, when the racially correlated character
of the Court's standing decisions is combined with evidence about the
Supreme Court's racial attitudes, which can be gleaned from other
civil rights decisions, the Supreme Court seems to be engaged in "in-
tentional" discrimination sufficient to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.5 Statutory and constitutional antidiscrimination laws are,
however, effectively inapplicable to the Supreme Court.6 This immu-
2 See SPAN, RACE ACAINST THE COURT, supra note 1, at 19-26, 94-99, 104-60; Girar-
deau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1982-90, 2000-08, 2012-18 (1990).
3 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (imposing "case" or "controversy" restriction on federal
court jurisdiction).
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Title VII is inapplicable by its terms. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (excluding
United States from definition of "employer" covered by the Act). Although the Equal Pro-
tection Clause technically applies to all government actions, there is no governmental body
that possesses the formal authority to enforce constitutional guarantees against the Court.
Even if there were, the Court has proclaimed itself to be the final expositor of constitu-
tional meaning. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (recognizing "the basic princi-
ple that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,"
and quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1808), for proposition that
"[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is"); cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337-52 (1816) (rejecting argu-
ment that state courts are final expositors of constitutional meaning within spheres of state
sovereignty). The Court has, thereby, effectively insulated itself from constitutional ac-
countability. Ironically, this insulation enables the Court to implement the very types of
discriminatory preferences that the Court would be obliged to invalidate if expressed by
another branch of government.
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nity makes the Court a particularly expedient institution for preserv-
ing majority control over minority interests.
The Supreme Court is putatively charged with protecting the
rights of minorities from invasion by tyrannical majorities.7 Constitu-
tional history, however, reveals that the actual role played by the
Supreme Court has been considerably different From Dred Scot to
Plessy9 to Brown,10 the primary concern of the Court in race cases has
been the protection of favored majority interests. The Court has even
invalidated majoritarian efforts to protect minority rights when those
efforts have failed to comport with the Court's conception of majority
self-interest"n The standing decision in Northeastern Florida is, there-
fore, best understood as a recent addition to a long line of Supreme
Court decisions that subordinate the welfare of racial minorities to the
overriding interests of the majority.
Part I of this Article describes the contemporary law of standing,
highlighting its antagonism toward programmatic challenges to gov-
ernmental action, and describes the Court's decision in Northeastern
F/orida. Part II then demonstrates how difficult it is to square the out-
come in Northeastern Florida with the Court's other recent standing de-
cisions. Part III suggests that Northeastern Florida is symptomatic of a
more general trend in Supreme Court standing jurisprudence, pursu-
ant to which case outcomes tend to correlate with the plaintiffs' racial
interests in a way that would violate both Title VII and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause if these provisions applied to Supreme Court decisions.
The Article concludes that no matter how strong a showing can be
made of Supreme Court racial discrimination, such discrimination is,
curiously, inconsequential.
7 SeeMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-68 (1803) (function ofjudiciary
is to protect legal rights); see also THE FEDERAUsr No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (federal
judiciary obligated to invalidate acts of political branches that violate constitutional rights).
8 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding blacks not citizens
within meaning of United States Constitution).
9 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal interpreta-
tion of Equal Protection Clause).
10 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting Pe.Y's separate-
but-equal interpretation of Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution); see also
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 17), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering desegregation of
public schools "with all deliberate speed").
I See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to affirmative action plan adopted by city council of Richmond, Virginia).
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I
THE LAW OF STANDING
The law of standing is in a state of notorious disarray.' 2 The doc-
trine was designed to implement the Article III case-or-controversy re-
striction on federal jurisdiction by limiting the authority of the
judiciary to that which was necessary for the redress ofjusticiable inju-
ries. This limitation, in turn, permitted the politically-unaccountable
judiciary to minimize its interference with the actions of the politi-
cally-sensitive, coordinate branches of government. However, a coher-
ent concept of injury has proved to be elusive. As a result, standing
rules have not effectively distinguished between proper and improper
exercises ofjudicial authority. Indeed, they have given the Court little
guidance and nearly unlimited discretion in making judicial interven-
tion determinations.' 3
One of the Supreme Court's most recent statements of the law of
standing was articulated in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated
General Contractors v. City ofJacksonville.14 In Northeastern /orida, a con-
struction trade association challenged the constitutionality of a munic-
ipal law that set aside ten percent of the municipality's construction
funds for minority contractors. 15 The case presented the Court with
what has become a paradigmatic standing problem: an institutional
12 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("We need not mince words when we say
that the concept of 'Art. I standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all
of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it."); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Generalizations about standing
to sue are largely worthless as such."); 3 KENNETH C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE
§ 22.18 (Supp. 1965) ("[T]he Supreme Court's law of standing remains cluttered, con-
fused, and contradictory."); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1291 (1976) ("[T]he Supreme Court is struggling manfully, but with
questionable success, to establish a formula for delimiting who may sue that stops short of
'anybody who might be significantly affected by the situation he seeks to litigate.'"); Mark
V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonmen 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663
(1977) ("[Tlhe law of standing lacks a rational conceptual framework. It is little more
than a set of disjointed rules dealing with a common subject."); Mark V. Tushnet, The
Sociology of Article L7 A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1698, 1705 (1980)
("The ease of manipulation [of standing criteria] is especially enhanced because the doc-
trine is so amorphous and confused."); Michael A. Wolff, Standing to Sue: CapriciousApplica-
tion of Direct Injury Standard, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 663 (1976) ("The confusing and
inconsistent nature of these decisions has been the subject of judicial and scholarly com-
ment."); see generally ERWIN CHEMERINSK', FEDERALJURISDICTION § 2.3 (2d ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing standing).
13 Some commentators have argued that the existence of such Supreme Court discre-
tion is a good thing because it permits the Court to avoid improper involvement in polit-
ical decisionmaking. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BiCxEL, THE LAsr DANGEROus BRANCH: THE
SUPRE s COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrTcs 111-98 (1962) (terming doctrines such as standing
.passive virtues").
14 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).
15 Id. at 2299-2301.
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plaintiff, with a political or ideological interest in the resolution of a
controversial social issue, sought the Court's assistance in the advance-
ment of that interest.
The Northeastern Florida Court first recited a series of stringent re-
quirements for pleading, causation, and redressability that seem
designed to minimize private challenges to government programs by
ideological plaintiffs who do not suffer traditional injuries. But the
Court then applied these requirements to the facts in a way that
strained to permit the very type of programmatic challenge that the
stringent requirements seem to preclude. As a result, the decision not
only contributes confusion to the law of standing, but also raises suspi-
cions about the Supreme Court's motivation.
A. The Law of Northeastern Florida
The standing portion of Justice Thomas's majority opinion in
Northeastern Florida begins with the assertion that "[t]he doctrine of
standing is 'an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-contro-
versy requirement of Article III,' which itself 'defines with respect to
the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the
Federal Government is founded.'' 16 This opening reflects the cus-
tomary manner in which federal judges begin their discussions of
standing;' 7 it emphasizes that it would be undemocratic and unconsti-
tutional for politically unaccountable judges to substitute their policy
preferences for those of politically accountable legislative and execu-
tive officials.' 8 The distinction between ajusticiable "case" or "contro-
versy" and a nonjusticiable request for judicial intervention turns on
the presence of an Article III injury that will be redressed by a
favorable decision on the merits. Accordingly, in Northeastern Florida,
Justice Thomas summarized the law of standing in the following
manner:
It has been established by a long line of cases that a party seeking to
invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must demonstrate three things:
(1) "injury in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a legally pro-
16 Id. at 2301 (quoting respectively Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2180,
2136 (1992), and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
17 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
40-45 .(1976); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215-16
(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-72 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 731-34 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968).
18 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1928). This account of the constitutional dimension of
standing is developed more fully in Spann, Expository Justice, supra note 1 (arguing that
justiciability rules are best understood as facilitating expository, rather than dispute-resolu-
tion, function of federal courts).
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tected interest that is "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ac-
tual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" [citing Lujan];
(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged con-
duct, by which we mean that the injury "fairly can be traced to the
challenged action of the defendant," and has not resulted "from the
independent action of some third party not before the court" [cit-
ing Simon]; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of ob-
taining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not
"too speculative" [citing Allen]. These elements are the "irreducible
minimum" required by the Constitution.' 9
Justice Thomas thus enumerated three requirements for standing: in-
jury, causation, and redressability.
Since the 1970 companion cases of Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations v. Camp2 ° and Barlow v. Collins,2 ' the injury re-
quirement for standing has meant "injury in fact." "Injury in fact" en-
compasses real-world injuries, as opposed to the invasion of a formal
legal interest, which had previously been required for standing.22 In
Data Processing the Court held that the increased competition con-
fronting data processing firms from expanding national banks was an
economic injury sufficient for standing.23 Likewise in Barlow v. Col-
linS,2 4 the Court held that the increased vulnerability of tenant farm-
ers to economic pressure exerted by their landlords constituted an
adequate injury for standing.2 5
19 Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (citations omitted).
20 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
21 397 U.S. 159, 163 (1970).
22 The first three lines of the quoted portion ofJustice Thomas's opinion in Northeast-
ern Florida seem to equate the injury-in-fact and legal-interest tests even though they are
analytically very different. See Spann, Expositoy Justice, supra note 1, at 620-21. Compare
Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (equating the two tests) with Data Processing, 397
U.S. at 152-53 (emphasizing the difference between the two tests). This confusion repli-
cates an earlier confusion introduced by Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), which Justice Thomas quoted. See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct.
at 2301-02. (In order to comply with citation conventions, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa-
tion has been referred to as "National W'idlife Federation" and Lujan v. Defenders of Widdlife has
been referred to as "Lujan.") The point is esoteric enough thatJustice Thomas, who pos-
sesses no particular expertise in administrative law or the law of standing, could under-
standably have failed to appreciate it. What is more surprising is that in conflating the
"injury in fact" test with the "legal interest" test, Justice Thomas was quoting the Lujan
opinion ofJustice Scalia. See id. Justice Scalia, as a former law professor and expert in
administrative law, is generally regarded as having considerable competence in such mat-
ters. For a suggestion that this equation is not an error but an effort to supplant the injury-
in-fact test with a restored legal-interest test, see RONALD CASS E AL., ADMINISTRATIVE lAW.
CASES AND MATERLAtS 316 (2d ed. 1994).
23 See Data Processing; 397 U.S. at 152-53.
24 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
25 See id. at 160-63.
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Noneconomic harms such as the harm to aesthetic, conserva-
tional, recreational, and even spiritual values also satisfy the Court's
contemporary conceptions of an Article III injury.2 6 In United States v.
SCRAP,27 the Supreme Court found that law students working on a
school project suffered a sufficient injury to challenge an Interstate
Commerce Commission rate increase by virtue of their exposure to
the environmental harms that could result from the rate increase's
disincentive effect on recycling.28 Flast v. Cohen29 similarly recognized
the interest of an individual federal taxpayer in preventing the expen-
diture of federal funds in violation of the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses of the First Amendment to be sufficient for standing.30
Other cases, however, have denied standing for lack of an adequate
injury under seemingly similar facts, 31 exacerbating the substantial un-
certainty in the law of standing.3 2
The causation and redressability requirements that Justice
Thomas enumerated for standing are best understood as dual aspects
of a single concern. If an injury is proximately caused by the allegedly
unlawful action being challenged, then a judicial remedy will redress
that injury, thereby ensuring that the courts are not impermissibly in-
terfering with the political process by issuing advisory dicta.33 Since
1990, the Court has applied the causation and redressability require-
ments with extreme stringency. This trend is exemplified by two re-
cent standing opinions written by Justice Scalia.
First, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,34 the Court denied
standing to an environmental plaintiff challenging a decision of the
Reagan and Bush Administrations to open federal lands to increased
mining, oil, and natural gas exploitation. The plaintiff had submitted
affidavits averring recreational use of the lands in question, which
would have seemingly been sufficient for standing under SCRAP. Yet
Justice Scalia found the affidavits insufficient because they did not
identify with particularity which tracts were used by which afflants and
26 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
27 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
28 See id. at 672-76.
29 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
30 See id. at 85-88.
31 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (environmentalists lack
standing to enforce Endangered Species Act); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990) (environmentalists lack standing to challenge government decision to permit
increased mining of federal lands); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (taxpayers lack standing to challenge
gift of government property to religious school as violation of Establishment Clause of First
Amendment).
32 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (documenting confusion in law of
standing).
33 See Spann, ExpositoryJustice supra note 1, at 589-92, 636-44.
34 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
19951 1429
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
did not correlate those tracts with particular contemplated leases.35
As a result, the injury about which the plaintiff complained was
deemed speculative, not proximately connected to particular projects,
and therefore not sufficiently imminent for judicial redress.3 6 The de-
manding pleading and proof requirements that the Court thus im-
posed made it difficult for nontraditional plaintiffs to use a single test
case to challenge a broad-based governmental program, such as the
Republican program to open federal lands to increased exploitation.
Only if a particular aspect of a program inflicted a traditionally recog-
nized injury would that aspect of the program be subject to review.37
Justice Scalia viewed programmatic challenges as inherently political,
rather than judicial, in nature.38
Second, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 39 Justice Scalia fortified
the Court's new pleading and proof requirements by giving them con-
stitutional grounding. His opinion denied standing to an environ-
mental group that sought foreign enforcement of the Endangered
Species Act because the plaintiff's members had not specified their
future plans to view endangered species in foreign countries with suf-
ficient particularity, as required under National Wildlife Federation.40
Moreover, the plaintiff's desired enforcement of the Act might not
result in any enhanced protection of endangered species because the
financial incentive scheme of the Endangered Species Act ultimately
35 Id. at 875-89. The plaintiff submitted two affidavits in support of its opposition to
the government's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The district court denied this
motion, and the court of appeals upheld the denial. On remand, the district court held a
hearing on the government's motion for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff's
lack of standing. After this hearing, the plaintiff submitted four more specific supplemen-
tal affidavits, but the district court rejected them as untimely. See id. at 879-82; cf. id. at 904
n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that five additional affidavits were submitted). The
court of appeals then reversed the district court, finding that the additional affidavits were
admissible and that the plaintiff had established a genuine issue of material fact concern-
ing whether its members used affected tracts of land and thus survived the government's
motion for summaryjudgment. See id. at 879-82. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that
the district court's refusal to accept the additional affidavits was proper and that the affida-
vits were nevertheless insufficient to survive the government's motion for summary judg-
ment. See id at 890-98.
36 See id. at 882-89.
37 See id. at 890-94. Justice Scalia asserted that a general policy decision was not "final
agency action" ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act until that general
policy decision was reduced to operative implementation decisions. Id.
38 Id. at 891 (arguing that requests for programmatic changes should be addressed to
Congress rather than to the courts).
39 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
40 See id. at 568-64. One affiant had traveled to Egypt in 1986 to observe the tradi-
tional habitat of the Nile crocodile, which she averred would suffer harm by American
oversight of the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile. The other affiant had
traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 to observe the Asian elephant and the leopard, which she
averred were threatened by the Mahaweli Project that was being funded by the United
States Agency for International Development. Both affiants had general, but not specific,
plans to take similar trips in the future. See id. at 564-65 n.2.
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depended upon the actions of third party foreign governments that
were not before the Court. Accordingly, the alleged failure to enforce
the Endangered Species Act did not produce an injury that was suffi-
ciently redressable to establish standing.41
Unlike the statutes involved in National Wildlife Federation, the En-
dangered Species Act at issue in Lujan had a "citizen suit" provision
that granted standing to any citizen to enforce its provisions. 42
AlthoughJustice Scalia recognized that the Court had in the past held
that Congress possessed the power to create statutory injuries suffi-
cient for Article III standing,43 in Lujan, he stated that Congress could
not confer standing on a plaintiff who did not suffer a traditional Arti-
cle III injury independent of the statutorily created right.44 Again,
Justice Scalia appears to have been trying to keep the courts out of
political disputes, even when Congress had by statute invited them to
participate in the resolution of such disputes.45
At the time the Court decided Northeastern Florida, the law of
standing had become very strict. A plaintiff could no longer establish
standing simply by demonstrating an "injury in fact." Rather, the
plaintiff had to establish, with a high degree of particularity in both
pleading and proof, that the injury was proximately caused by the
challenged conduct of the defendant; that the injury was imminent;
that the plaintiff's challenge was not a programmatic challenge to a
general government policy decision; and that the injury would be re-
dressed by a favorable decision on the merits.
B. The Facts of Northeastern Florida
Northeastern Florida presented the Supreme Court with what has
become a standard-forn challenge to the concept of affirmative ac-
tion. A trade association representing members of the white majority
challenged the constitutionality, under the Equal Protection Clause,
of an affirmative action program adopted through the political pro-
41 See id. at 568-71. This portion of the opinion was signed by only four justices-
Justice Scalia, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice White, andJustice Thomas. See id. at 557. In
addition to the uncertainty about how foreign governments would respond to the financial
incentives in the Endangered Species Act, Justice Scalia was unwilling to assume that the
other government agencies needed for effective enforcement would be bound to follow a
regulation promulgated by the defendant Secretary of the Interior. This was especially so
at the commencement of litigation in the district court-the time at which standing was to
be determined-when the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the binding effect of such
a regulation on other agencies. See id. at 569-71 nn.4 & 5.
42 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1) (1988) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his
own behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States... who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter.").
43 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73.
44 See id. at 571-78.
45 See id. at 572-78.
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cess to benefit racial minorities. 46 Since the Court confronted its first
modem affirmative action case in 1974,47 it has had considerable diffi-
culty with the affirmative action issue. From 1974 until 1989, the
Supreme Court was unable to issue a majority opinion resolving the
merits of a constitutional affirmative action case. It disposed of the
seven equal protection race cases that it considered during this period
with one per curiam 48 and six plurality opinions.49
Since 1989, however, the Court has issued five majority opinions
in affirmative action cases that it has resolved on constitutional
46 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2299 (1998). The Jacksonville ordinance creating the affirmative
action plan also extended the set-aside to women. Although the plaintiff trade association
may have had some minority and female members, most of its members did not qualify for
the minority set-aside under the terms of the plan, thereby prompting the trade association
to challenge its constitutionality. Id.
47 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissing challenge by white appli-
cant to University of Washington Law School affirmative action program on grounds of
mootness due to impending graduation of applicant, who had been admitted as result of
state Supreme Court order invalidating challenged program). Characterizing DeFunis as
the first modem affirmative action case treats the race-conscious school desegregation
cases as sui generis, although they too are technically affirmative action cases to the extent
that they authorize race-conscious remedies in order to benefit minority students. See, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1971) (authorizing race-
conscious pupil assignment as remedy for prior maintenance of unconstitutional dual
school system). The post-Civil War, Reconstruction cases can also be considered affirma-
tive action cases to the extent that they concerned the validity and interpretation of laws
and constitutional provisions enacted to benefit former black slaves. Cf The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (holding that special federal judicial protection
of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship was intended primarily to benefit former
black slaves).
48 See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam) (dismissing challenge
by white applicant to University of Washington Law School affirmative action program on
grounds of mootness, with four justices dissenting from mootness holding).
49 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (Brennan,J.) (four-justice plural-
ity opinion upholding constitutionality of district court order requiring Alabama to pro-
mote one black state trooper for every white state trooper promoted, in order to remedy
effects of past discrimination); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986) (Brennan, J.) (four-justice plurality opinion upholding constitutionality of hir-
ing goals, training fund, and contempt citation issued against recalcitrant union to remedy
past discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (Powell, J.)
(fourjustice plurality opinion invalidating consent decree protecting minority school
teachers in Jackson, Michigan from layoffs despite having lower seniority than white teach-
ers who were laid off); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Burger, CJ.) (three-
justice plurality opinion upholding 10% set-aside for minority contractors on federally
funded public works projects); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(Powell, J.) (opinion joined by four other justices, invalidating University of California at
Davis set-aside of 16% of medical school seats for minority students, and joined by four
different justices upholding constitutionality of remedial use of race in appropriate circum-
stances); UnitedJewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (White,J.) (plurality opinion
joined on various points by other justices, upholding constitutionality of race-conscious
New York legislative apportionment scheme designed to increase black voting strength).
1432 [Vol. 80:1422
COLOR-CODED STANDING
grounds,5 0 ultimately holding that all affirmative action programs-
whether federal, state, or local-are subject to strictjudicial scrutiny.51
Strict scrutiny has traditionally been fatal scrutiny, suggesting that all
affirmative action may now be unconstitutional.52 However, the Court
has also stated that it will cease to treat strict scrutiny as fatal scru-
tiny,53 thereby raising the possibility that some affirmative action pro-
grams will continue to be upheld in the future, even under the
stringent strict scrutiny standards.54 At the hornbook level of analysis,
therefore, it would appear that the Jacksonville set-aside plan at issue
in Northeastern Florida now may well be unconsituional-if the plain-
tiffs have standing to challenge its constitutionality.55
A municipal ordinance established the Jacksonville plan in 1984,
requiring the city to set aside ten percent of the funds expended on
municipal contracts during each fiscal year for "Minority Business En-
50 See Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (invalidating after strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause a state redistricting plan adopted to comply with the federal
Voting Rights Act because race was a "predominant" factor in drawing district lines);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (subjecting to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause a congressional presumption that minority construction
contractors are socially and economically disadvantaged); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993) (subjecting to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause a state redistricting
plan adopted to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act by increasing minority voting
strength); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding after interme-
diate scrutiny under the equal protection clause two FCC broadcast affirmative action
plans authorized by Congress in the exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City
of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (subjecting to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause a minority construction set-aside plan not authorized by Con-
gress in the exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf United
States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) (denying standing to white voters wishing to chal-
lenge the validity under the equal protection clause of a state redistricting plan for a dis-
trict in which the white voters did not reside). But see Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485 (granting
standing to white voters wishing to make the same challenge for a district in which they did
reside).
51 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (extending strict scrutiny from state and local to
federal affirmative action plans).
52 No racial classification has withstood strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause since the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1994). See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 572; see also Fullilove v. Klutznic, 448 U.S.
448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (Strict scrutiny is "strict in theory,
but fatal in fact."). Korematsu's tolerance of the race-based internment ofJapanese-Ameri-
can citizens is now generally regarded as the product of wartime hysteria, and the result is
widely discredited. See STONE ET Ai., supra note 1, at 572, and authorities cited therein.
53 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory but fatal in fact.' ") (citations omitted).
54 The test traditionally required under the strict scrutiny standard is that, in order to
be valid, the classification under review must advance a compelling state interest and must
be necessary to the advancement of that interest. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); cf Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
55 See infra part III.B.l.a (discussing affirmative action). The history of the Supreme
Court's law of affirmative action is discussed extensively in SPANN, RAcE AGAINST THE
COURT, supra note 1, at 119-49.
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terprises."56 The ordinance required these "MBEs," as they have come
to be known, to have at least fifty percent minority or female owner-
ship if privately held and fifty-one percent minority or female owner-
ship if publicly held.57 The term "minority" was defined to include
anyone who considered himself or herself to be "black, Spanish-speak-
ing, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or handicapped."58 The plan ap-
pears to have been modeled upon the federal set-aside program
whose constitutionality the Supreme Court had previously upheld in
Fullilove v. Klutznick. 59 To implement the program, the city's chief
purchasing officer was to designate certain contracts for MBE bidding,
and the designated contracts could be bid upon only by contractors
who had been prequalified as MBEs under the procedures specified
in the ordinance.60
The plaintiff trade association represented the interests of its
members, who were individuals and firms engaged in the construction
industry in Jacksonville. Because most of the members of the plaintiff
organization did not qualify as minorities within the terms of the ordi-
nance, they were not eligible to bid on municipal contracts designated
for the minority set-aside. From 1984 to 1989, the first five years dur-
ing which the program was in operation, $14.6 million in contracts
were awarded to racial minorities under the program, comprising ap-
proximately two percent of the city's total expenditures. 6'
In 1989 the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida, arguing that the Jacksonville set-
aside plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
56 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2299 (1993).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) (three-justice plurality opinion upholding 10%
set-aside for minority contractors on federally funded public works projects). Not only the
10% minority set-aside concept, but the specification of particular racial minority groups
(including Aleuts, who are unlikely to be prevalent in Jacksonville) and the definition of
minority corporate control utilized in the Jacksonville ordinance (including different per-
centages for publicly and privately owned businesses) were identical to those specified in
the federal Public Works Employment Act of 1977, which the Supreme Court upheld in
Fullilove. See id. at 456-59. Because the law of affirmative action was very uncertain when
the Jacksonville ordinance was enacted in 1984, municipalities often copied the provisions
of the federal statute upheld in Fullilove in order to maximize the likelihood that their
ordinances would also be found constitutional. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-80, 505-06 (1989) (discussing similarities between Richmond, Vir-
ginia minority set-aside plan and the statute upheld in Fullilove, as well as the belief of the
city's legal counsel that plan would be declared constitutional under the Fullilove decision);
id. at 528-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that Richmond set-aside plan was pat-
terned upon plan upheld in Fullilove).
60 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992).
61 Seei,.
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Amendment both on its face and as applied.62 Although the program
had been in effect for five years, the district court nevertheless issued
a temporary restraining order two days after the plaintiff filed the
complaint.63 Fourteen days later, the court issued a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting the city from giving further effect to the set-aside
plan.64 In March 1990 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court order on the grounds that
the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate irreparable injury and re-
manded the case for a trial on the merits.6 5
In May 1990, on remand, the district court entered summary
judgment for the plaintiff, denied the city's cross-motion for summary
judgment, and permanently enjoined the city from further imple-
menting the set-aside program. The court held that the set-aside pro-
gram was unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's then-recent
decision in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.66 In January 1992 the
Court of Appeals again reversed the district court, this time holding
that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.67 The Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the plaintiff lacked standing because it had not established
injury of an economic nature in that it had not demonstrated that
"but for the program, any [trade association] member would have bid
successfully for any of these contracts."68 On October 5, 1992, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the cir-
cuits. 69 On October 27, 1992, just twenty-two days after the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari, the Jacksonville City Council repealed
the set-aside ordinance that had been the subject of the litigation and
replaced it with a new ordinance that took effect the following day.70
62 See id. at 1217.
63 See id.
64 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, No. 89-278 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 1989).
65 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 1990). The ChiefJudge argued that the suit should be
dismissed for lack of standing. See id. at 1287-88 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring).
66 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jackson-
ville, No. 89-278 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 1990) (citing City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989)).
67 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992).
68 Id. at 1219.
69 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 50 (1992). The Court found the decision of the Eleventh Circuit to conflict
with the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in O'Donnell Construction co. v.
District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 930 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992). See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Con-
tractors v. City ofJacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2300 (1993).
70 Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2300.
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The new ordinance appears to have been designed to accommo-
date the changes that the Supreme Court had made to its Fullilove
holding in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.71 In Croson, the Court
emphasized the need for findings of past discrimination and for flexi-
bility in fashioning a plan that was narrowly tailored to remedy the
continuing consequences of that past discrimination. 72 Accordingly,
the newJacksonville plan defined the term "minority" to include only
women and blacks, rather than the seven categories enumerated in
the original ordinance. 73 In addition, the new ordinance replaced the
ten percent "set-aside" of the original ordinance with "participation
goals" that ranged from five to sixteen percent depending upon the
type of contract involved, the ownership of the contractor, and the
fiscal year in which the contract was awarded. Finally, the new ordi-
nance provided five methods for the city to use in pursuing the partic-
ipation goals, with the determination of the most appropriate method
to be made on a project-by-project basis. One of these methods, the
"Sheltered Market Plan," reserved certain contracts for bidding by
companies that were owned by blacks or women.74
After the city repealed the original ordinance, the city moved to
dismiss the appeal pending before the Supreme Court as moot. On
December 14, 1992, the Court denied this motion without explana-
tion,75 although it did include a discussion of mootness in its subse-
quent opinion resolving the appeal.76 In the Court's final opinion,
issued on June 14, 1993, Justice Thomas, writing for a seven justice
majority, held that the case was not moot because the city's repeal of
the original set-aside ordinance was merely a voluntary cessation of a
challenged activity and thus did not serve as a basis for mootness.77
The opinion asserted that the voluntary cessation rule was particularly
applicable to the Jacksonville ordinance, in which the challenged pro-
vision was immediately reenacted as the "Sheltered Market Plan."78
Justice Thomas went on to hold that the plaintiff trade association did
not lack standing, even though it had failed to demonstrate that even
one of its members would have been awarded one of the contracts at
issue but for the set-aside plan. He reasoned that, with respect to an
equal protection challenge, the denial of an opportunity to bid on a
contract constituted an injury sufficient to confer standing, regardless
71 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
72 See id. at 486-511.
73 Northeastern F/orida, 113 S. C. at 2800.
74 Id.
75 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 808 (1992).
76 See Northeastern Forida, 113 S. C. at 2301.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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of whether the putative bid would have ultimately been accepted.7 9
Only Justices O'Connor and Blackmun declined to join Justice
Thomas's majority opinion, dissenting on the grounds that the case
had been rendered moot by the enactment of the new Jacksonville
ordinance.8 0
II
DoCTRINAL PROBLEMS
The principal problem with Northeastern Norida is that it cannot be
squared with the existing law of standing. As a doctrinal matter, Jus-
tice Thomas's opinion in Northeastern Florida ignores the invigorated
standing requirements that the Supreme Court adopted during its
preceding Terms. National Wildlife Federation holds that a plaintiff
must suffer an injury that is proximate, imminent, and nonprogram-
matic to establish standing. Moreover, satisfaction of these require-
ments at the summary judgment stage of litigation demands a
pleading and evidentiary showing that is highly specific.8 ' In addition,
Lujan superimposes on an otherwise qualifying injury a rigid redres-
sability requirement that is very difficult to satisfy when the injury is
ultimately traceable to the actions of third parties.82 This redres-
sability requirement has been deemed so essential that the Court
found it to be compelled by Article 111.83
The plaintiff in Northeastern F/orida satisfied none of these doctri-
nal requirements. Moreover, the fact that the Court issued an opin-
ion upholding the plaintiff's standing despite the rather obvious
mootness of the case makes Justice Thomas's opinion seem gratui-
tous. Although the law of standing is quite confused, it is not so con-
fused that one can fail to spot Northeastern Florida as a suspicious
aberration in the Court's justiciability jurisprudence.
A. The Injury Is Not Proximate
The lost contractual opportunities that the plaintiff claimed were
suffered by its members in Northeastern Florida were not proximate in the
sense that National Wildlife Federation now requires. In National Wildlife
Federation, the plaintiff was denied standing to challenge the with-
drawal of certain federal lands from federal protection because the
plaintiff's allegations and proof were not sufficiently specific. 84 The
79 See id. at 2301-04.
80 Id. at 2305 (O'Connor, J., dissenting with Blackmun, J.).
81 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing National Wildlife
Federation).
82 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-62.
83 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text (discussing Lujan).
84 See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
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plaintiff had alleged that its members "are suffering and will continue
to suffer injury... [because they] use and enjoy the environmental
resources that will be adversely affected by the challenged actions...
regularly... for fishing, hunting, bird and wildlife watching, canoeing
and boating, hiking, camping, and other similar activities."85 In addi-
tion, the plaintiff appended to its complaint a list of 788 land status
actions under the challenged program that illustrated the alleged ad-
verse effects.86
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not identify specific
tracts of land used by its members that would be opened for mining
operations. Rather, the plaintiff's affidavits averred that the plaintiff's
members used land in the "vicinity" of certain identified tracts. The
Supreme Court found these averments to be insufficiently specific.8 7
Justice Scalia stated that the affidavits were insufficient because, in the
context of a motion for summary judgment, the injury requirement
is assuredly not satisfied by averments which state only that one of
respondent's members uses unspecified portions of an immense
tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has oc-
curred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action.
It will not do to "presume" the missing facts because without them
the affidavits would not establish the injury that they generally
allege.88
In Northeastern Forida, the plaintiff trade association "alleged that
its members regularly bid on construction contracts in Jacksonville,
and that they would have bid on contracts set aside pursuant to the
city's ordinance were they so able."89 This allegation is less specific
than the allegation found inadequate in National Wildlife Federation in
that it does not refer to particular construction contracts the way the
National Wildlife Federation complaint referred to particular tracts of
federal land.90 Moreover, despite Justice Scalia's insistence in National
Wildlife Federation that highly specific affidavits were required at the
summary judgment stage-not simply conclusory allegations that
would suffice at the motion-to-dismiss stage, as illustrated by cases
such as SCRAPF9-Justice Thomas's opinion in Northeastern Florida
makes no reference whatsoever to any affidavits identifying specific
85 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
from complaint).
86 See id. at 312.
87 See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 885-89.
88 See id. at 889.
89 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1993); see also id. at 2299.
90 See supra text accompanying note 86 (discussing list of 788 land status actions ap-
pended to plaintiff's complaint in National Widlife Federation).
91 See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 883-85, 889.
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contracts on which the plaintiff's members were prepared to bid.
Rather, Justice Thomas upheld the plaintiff's standing solely on the
basis of a single allegation made in the complaint.92
Not only did the Northeastern Florida plaintiff fail to provide affida-
vits, but the allegation on which it relied was not even as specific as the
National Wildlife Federation affidavits. In National Wildlife Federation, the
plaintiff's members averred that they used land that was at least in the
"vicinity" of particular tracts that the government had opened to ex-
ploitation. The conceptual equivalent of the "vicinity" allegation
under the facts of Northeastern Florida would have been an allegation
that contractors who bid on particular types of contracts in particular
geographic areas of the city were prepared to bid on those types of
contracts, and that those types of contracts were going to be removed
from general bidding because of their inclusion in the set-aside pro-
gram. The plaintiff in Northeastern Florida made no such allegations.
The clearest way to illustrate the conflict between National Wildlife
Federation and Northeastern Florida is to apply Justice Scalia's language
in National Wildlife Federation to the facts of the Northeastern Florida case.
If Justice Scalia's words were adapted to the facts of Northeastern Flor-
ida, they would assert that the injury requirement
is assuredly not satisfied by [allegations] which state only that one of
[plaintiff's] members [bids on] unspecified portions of an immense
[public contracting program], on some portions of which [minority
set-aside] activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of
the governmental action. It will not do to "presume" the missing
facts because without them the [allegations] would not establish the
injury that they generally allege.93
As this transposition of Justice Scalia's language demonstrates,
the plaintiff in Northeastern Florida lacked standing for precisely the
same reason that the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation lacked
92 See NortheasternFlorida, 113 S. Ct. at 2301-05. The 6nlyjustificationJustice Thomas
offers for not requiring affidavits or some other evidence at the summary judgment stage is
that the City ofJacksonville had moved for summary judgment on the merits and had not
challenged the plaintiff's standing. See id at 2300 n.1. This assertion is puzzling in light of
the Court's insistence in Lujan-the standing decision that immediately preceded North-
eastern F/oida-that the invigorated injury requirements adopted by the Court in National
Wdlife Federation were Article Il, constitutional requirements, not mere prudential ones.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-62, 571-78. As a result, the issue of the plaintiff's standing in
Northeastern Forida was a jurisdictional issue that the Court had the constitutional obliga-
tion to resolve for itself regardless of whether the city chose to object. See United States v.
Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (court required to address the issue of standing even if
the parties fail to raise the issue). Because National Wildlife Federation established that affi-
davits, rather than mere allegations, were required to resolve this jurisdictional issue at the
summaryjudgment stage, it is unclear why Justice Thomas thought that he could dispense
with the affidavit requirement and rely solely on the conclusory pleadings contained in the
complaint.
93 Cf. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889.
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standing. In both cases, the plaintiffs injury was not sufficiently proxi-
mate to the defendant's action to give rise to ajusticiable injury.
B. The Injury Is Not Imminent
The alleged injury in Northeastern Florida was also insufficiently im-
minent to serve as a basis for standing under National Wildlife Federa-
tion. Although the National Wildlife Federation Court stressed the
specificity defects of the two member affidavits that the district court
had accepted, there were four additional member affidavits that the
district court refused to consider. Those additional affidavits appear
to have presented no specificity problems, but the district court never-
theless rejected them as untimely.94 Although Justice Scalia was will-
ing to affirm the district court's discretionary decision to reject the
affidavits as untimely,95 his primary holding with respect to the four
supplemental affidavits was that the injuries they averred were not suf-
ficiently imminent to establish standing. For Justice Scalia, the prob-
lem with the four supplemental affidavits was not that they were
insufficiently specific in identifying tracts of affected federal property,
but rather that the exploitation of the identified tracts had not yet
progressed far enough to establish the plaintiff's standing.96
Although such concerns are typically viewed as relating to the doc-
trine of ripeness rather than standing,97 Justice Scalia chose to infuse
an imminence requirement into the law of standing as well.98
Once again, comparing the facts of National Wildlife Federation to
the facts of Northeastern Florida reveals that the Northeastern Florida
plaintiff did not satisfy the Court's new imminence requirement for
standing. In National Wildlife Federation, Justice Scalia discussed one of
the four supplemental affidavits, noting that the affiant averred that a
particular company had filed an application for a permit to mine a
portion of the tract of land her affidavit identified as public land that
she used for recreational and aesthetic purposes. The Bureau of Land
Management, however, had not yet acted on that application.
Although the affiant's injury would have been sufficient for standing
had the permit been granted, it was, according to Justice Scalia, "im-
possible to tell [prior to issuance of the permit] where or whether
mining activities will occur. Indeed, it is often impossible to tell from
94 See id. at 881, 890-98.
95 See id. at 894-98.
96 See id. at 891-94; id. at 892 n.3 (discussing contingencies that would have to occur
before exploitation of federal lands actually commenced).
97 See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-56 (1967) (discussing ripeness re-
quirement for judicial review of administrative agency actions); see also Gardner v. Toilet
Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 171-73 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158,
164-66 (1967) (same); see generally BREYER & STEwART, supra note 1, at 1092-1115 (same).
98 See National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 891-94.
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a classification order alone, whether mining activities will even be
permissible."99
In Northeastern Florida, there were no affidavits or allegations of
comparable specificity.100 Moreover, the plaintiff's general allegation
that some of its members would have bid on set-aside contracts were it
not for the challenged minority set-aside program was less imminent
than the supplemental affidavits found wanting in National Wildlife
Federation.
In National Wildlife Federation, a permit had at least been applied
for, and the only contingency at the time of the litigation related to
whether the government would grant or deny the permit application.
In Northeastern Florida, by contrast, no member of the plaintiff trade
association had ever applied for a contract. 101 As a result, the immi-
nence problem was greater in Northeastern Florida than in National
Wildlife Federation in three ways: First, in Northeastern Florida it was un-
certain whether any of the plaintiff's members would have the time,
inclination, or capacity to bid on any particular contract that the city
put out for competitive bidding. Second, it was uncertain whether the
city would grant any particular contract to any of the plaintiff s mem-
bers who were prepared to bid on them. Third, it was uncertain
whether any contract that one of the plaintiff's members was prepared
to bid on, and that the city was prepared to award to that member,
would be set aside by the city for exclusive minority bidding.
These three contingencies indicate that the plaintiff in Northeast-
ern Florida did not satisfy the imminence requirement that precluded
standing in National Wildlife Federation, in which only one contingency
was present. Justice Scalia's language in National Wildlife Federation is
again instructive: Given such contingencies, it is "impossible to tell
where or whether [contracting] activities will occur. Indeed, it is
often impossible to tell from a [set-aside program] alone whether
[particular contracts] will even be [granted]. u"02
There is yet another reason why it is unreasonable to claim that
the plaintiff in Northeastern Florida satisfied the National Wildlife Federa-
tion imminence requirement. Far from being imminent, the plain-
tiff's challenge appears to have been moot. After the Supreme Court
decided City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,10 3 the continued constitu-
tional validity of Fullilove-type minority set-aside programs, such as the
99 See id. at 892 n.3 (discussing affidavit of Peggy Peterson, one of the original affiants
who also filed one of the four supplemental affidavits after the standing issue was drawn
into focus in the district court).
100 See supra part IIA.
101 See Northeastern Fkrida, 113 S. Ct. at 2299, 2304 (complaint alleged only that un-
named members of plaintiff trade association would have bid on set-aside contracts).
102 Cf National WldlifeFed'n, 497 U.S. at 892 n.3.
103 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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program originally adopted by the Jacksonville City Council, was
called into serious question. 10 4 Accordingly, when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Northeastern Florida, the Jacksonville City Council
immediately replaced its set-aside program with a new minority prefer-
ence program that relied upon more flexible "participation goals"
that could be achieved through one of five alternative strategies, se-
lected on a case-by-case basis. 10 5 The new program's substitution of
"participation goals" for set-aside "quotas," as well as its reliance on a
case-by-case selection among remedial strategies, appears to have been
a direct effort to comply with the dictates of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Croson, in which the Court disapproved of the use of quotas
and stressed the need for flexible discrimination remedies that were
narrowly tailored to the scope of the past discrimination. 106 In sum,
the set-aside plan whose constitutionality the plaintiff challenged no
longer existed at the time the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
had standing to challenge it.
Although one of the alternatives available under the new pro-
gram, the "Sheltered Market Plan," was in effect a minority set-aside
with variable percentage goals, the Court had no evidence about how
Jacksonville would implement the new program. 07 Because the Shel-
tered Market Plan was only one of five alternatives, it was not clear
whether the city would ever use that alternative. Moreover, if it did
use the alternative, it was unknown what percentage goals would be
selected, and what contextual factors would go into the selection of
those percentage goals-issues that would be very relevant to any ad-
judication of the constitutionality of the new program under Croson.
These issues raise the very sort of contingencies that the National Wild-
life Federation Court found fatal to standing under the imminence re-
quirement. Yet the Northeastern Florida Court did not find them
troubling, even though they seem central to any imminence inquiry.
The only justification that Justice Thomas offered in Northeastern
Florida for ignoring the salient mootness of the plaintiff s claim was
the exception to the doctrine of mootness for defendants who volun-
tarily cease their challenged conduct. 08 This voluntary cessation ex-
ception is intended to ensure that a defendant cannot escape the
possibility of an adjudication on the merits by ceasing to engage in a
104 See id at 486-93 (applying more stringent standard of equal protection scrutiny to
state and local affirmative action programs than to congressional affirmative action pro-
grams); id. at 493-509 (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, municipal set-aside pro-
gram very similar to Jacksonville program).
105 See Northeastern Forida, 113 S. C. at 2300.
106 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-511.
107 See Northeastern Forida, 113 S. Ct. at 2300.
108 See id. at 2301.
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disputed action each time the action is challenged in court.'0 9 Ac-
cordingly, the exception does not apply to situations in which the de-
fendant modifies the challenged action in order to honor a recent
change in Supreme Court law.110
The voluntary cessation exception seems inapplicable to North-
eastern Florida. Application of the exception might have made sense if
there were some danger that the city of Jacksonville would re-institute
the old set-aside program once the litigation was dismissed on moot-
ness grounds. But there was no such danger. The City ofJacksonville
had modified its program in order to comply with, rather than evade,
new Supreme Court requirements for affirmative action plans.
Notwithstanding this change, only the old set-aside program was
before the Supreme Court. As far as the record revealed, the new
program had never been used, and it had certainly never been chal-
lenged by the plaintiff. Because the only program before the Court
was a program that was no longer in effect, it is difficult to imagine a
case that could be less imminent than Northeastern F/orida was at the
time that the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff standing to main-
tain it.
Even if Jacksonville's abandonment of its old set-aside plan did
not technically deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction on moot-
ness grounds, it would still fail to satisfy the imminence requirement
that is now essential to standing. In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Cas-
tle,"' the case thatJustice Thomas purported to follow in Northeastern
f/orida,l2 the Supreme Court stated: "Such abandonment is an im-
portant factor bearing on the question whether a court should exer-
cise its power to enjoin the defendant from renewing the practice, but
that is a matter relating to the exercise rather than the existence of
judicial power."1'3 After having gone to such great lengths to erect
the imminence requirement in National Wildlife Federation, the absence
of imminence in Northeastern Forida would certainly constitute suffi-
cient reason for declining to exercise any residue of jurisdiction that
the Court might have retained underJustice Thomas's reading of the
mootness doctrine." 4
109 See id.; City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1982); United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203-04 (1968); United States
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
110 Cf. Northeastern Florida 113 S. Ct. at 2301 n.3 (degree of difference between old and
new ordinance controls moomess issue).
11 455 U.S. 283 (1982).
112 See Northeastern F/orida, 113 S. Ct. at 2301.
113 City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 289.
114 But see United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203-04
(1968) (asserting without elaboration or explanation that Court had "no choice" but to
decide case that was not moot).
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C. The Injury Is Not Nonprogrammatic
The stringent specificity requirements thatJustice Scalia imposed
in National Wildlife Federation seem on their face to be artificial. It is
not apparent why an organizational plaintiff should have standing if
its members make recreational or aesthetic use of a tract of land that
the government has chosen to open up to commercial exploitation,
but not if the members make use of land that is merely in the "vicin-
ity" of the tract opened to exploitation. 1 5 After all, recreational and
aesthetic interests can be harmed whether a company is mining the
tract of land on which one is camping or is mining an adjoining tract.
If Justice Scalia's specificity requirement is to have any meaningful
content, it must be viewed as an incident to his more general view that
the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation had not challenged a "final
agency action."1 16
The "agency action" that the plaintiff challenged in National Wild-
life Federation consisted of two subsidiary actions. First, there was an
initial, general decision made by the Department of the Interior dur-
ing the Reagan Administration to withdraw federal lands from federal
protection so that they could be opened up for commercial exploita-
tion. Second, this general decision was followed by a series of specific
actions taken during the Reagan and Bush Administrations to open
up particular tracts of land to commercial exploitation. The plaintiff
alleged that both the initial decision to adopt a program withdrawing
public lands from federal protection and the discrete subsidiary ac-
tions taken to implement that withdrawal program constituted "final
agency actions" that were taken in violation of various environmental
laws.117
Justice Scalia's opinion held that no such "program" was subject
to judicial review. Assuming that the alleged program existed, he rea-
soned that it was an initial agency action. The action did not become
"final" until it had been implemented with respect to particular tracts
of land. 118 Therefore, Justice Scalia's insistence on highly specific ref-
erences to particular tracts of land in the plaintiffs affidavits and on a
high level of imminence with respect to the likely development of
each particular tract was meant to ensure thatjudicial review would be
delayed until the implementation phase of the land withdrawal "pro-
gram." In sum, Justice Scalia was willing to permit judicial review of
particular applications of the land withdrawal "program," but not of
the "program" itself.
115 See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 885-89 (1990) (holding "vicinity"
affidavit insufficiently specific for standing).
116 See id. at 890-94.
117 See id.
118 See id.
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One could certainly disagree with Justice Scalia's preference for
implementation-level, father than programmatic, challenges to newly-
adopted executive policies. Although implementation challenges are
likely to be accompanied by the enhanced contextual benefits that the
doctrine of ripeness is intended to secure, they are also likely to be
accompanied by high levels of inertia, entrenchment, and sunk costs
that will make it more difficult for a reviewing court to invalidate an
agency's implementation actions. Moreover, the heightened practical
impediments to maintaining implementation challenges-such as
preparing specific affidavits for each of the thousands of implementa-
tion actions that an agency might take in connection with one
programmatic decision-will mean that many implementation actions
will simply have to go unchallenged.
Justice Scalia was aware of this difficulty in National Wildlife Federa-
tion. His majority opinion stated:
The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frus-
trating to an organization such as respondent, which has as its ob-
jective across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and the
streams and forests that support it. But this is the traditional, and
remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts. Except
where Congress explicitly provides for our correction of the admin-
istrative process at a higher level of generality, we intervene in the
administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a spe-
cific "final agency action" has an actual or immediately threatened
effect.119
It appears thatJustice Scalia preferred the risk of under-enforcement
to the dangers that he perceived to accompany programmatic
challenges.
Justice Scalia never specified what dangers might be associated
with a programmatic challenge. He merely refers to the customary
dangers associated with claims that are not yet ripe for review. These
ripeness dangers, however, are often outweighed by the dangers of
delaying review. 120 Accordingly, it is possible thatJustice Scalia feared
stringent private enforcement itself-which would be facilitated if
programmatic challenges were permitted-and preferred instead the
diluted level of private enforcement that would result from allowing
implementation-only challenges. Regardless of how one views the
prudence of the Supreme Court's preclusion of programmatic chal-
119 I- at 894. This assertion is somewhat disingenuous in thatJustice Scalia is giving
new meaning to the statutory term "final agency action" in the Administrative Procedure
Act, not simply following a settled interpretation of the statutory language adopted by
Congress.
120 See id. at 893 (quoting Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-54 (1967) (permit-
ting preenforcement challenge to drug advertising regulations where dangers of delaying
review outweighed danger of permitting preenforcement review)).
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lenges to government programs, however, it is clear that the Court
failed to apply its own programmatic preclusion in Northeastern Florida.
As the proximity 21 and imminence122 discussions above illus-
trate, the plaintiff's challenge in Northeastern Florida was a program-
matic challenge, not a challenge to any particular implementation of
the Jacksonville set-aside plan. None of the plaintiff's members had
bid on or been denied a contract on the grounds that the contract
had been set aside for a minority contractor. 123 Rather, the plaintiffs
challenge was to the abstract idea of a minority set-aside "program."
Like the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiff in North-
eastern Florida attempted an "across-the-board" challenge at the adop-
tion, rather than the implementation, stage of the government
program. And like the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation, the
plaintiff in Northeastern Florida made a challenge that occurred at too
high a "level of generality" to constitute "final agency action" forjudi-
cial review. As a result, the plaintiff in Northeastern Florida lacked
standing to maintain its programmatic challenge every bit as much as
did the plaintiff in National Wildlife Federation.
D. The Injury Is Not Redressable
In Lujan the Supreme Court reaffirmed the strict standing de-
mands it had adopted in National Wildlife Federation, and then gave
those demands constitutional status by linking them to an enhanced
redressability requirement.124 Justice Scalia's majority opinion speci-
fies a three-part test that the plaintiff must meet in order to establish
the existence of an injury sufficient to satisfy the Article III case-or-
controversy requirement. First, the plaintiff has to suffer an "injury in
fact" that is "concrete and particularized," as well as "actual or immi-
nent," rather than "conjectural or hypothetical." Second, there must
be a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct, establishing that the injury is not the result of the
"independent actions of some third party not before the court."
Third, it must be "likely" and not merely "speculative" that the plain-
tiff's injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision" on the merits.125
In Northeastern Florida, Justice Thomas quoted Justice Scalia's Lu-
jan opinion in identifying the "irreducible minimum" that is required
121 See supra part IA
122 See supra part II.B.
123 See Northeastern Fborida, 113 S. Ct. at 2299, 2304 (complaint alleged only that un-
named members of plaintiff trade association would have bid on set-aside contracts).
124 See supra notes 39-45 (discussing Lujan opinion).
125 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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for standing, 26 but ultimately disregarded the redressability element
ofJustice Scalia's three-part test in holding that the plaintiff trade as-
sociation had standing. In terms of redressability, Lujan and Northeast-
ern I/oida are indistinguishable. The Court characterized the injury
asserted by the plaintiff in Lujan as too attenuated and too dependent
upon the actions of third parties to be redressable within the meaning
of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement. The plaintiff had
challenged the legality of a new regulation promulgated by the Secre-
tary of the Interior that exempted United States funded foreign con-
struction projects from the Endangered Species Act requirement for
interagency consultation. This requirement ensured that federally-
funded actions were not likely to jeopardize any endangered or
threatened species. In support of its standing, the plaintiff had sub-
mitted affidavits from two of its members who averred that they had
traveled to particular foreign countries in order to observe specified
endangered species that were jeopardized by specified funded
projects, and that they intended to do so again in the future.127
After ruling that the absence of particular dates and particular-
ized plans for these future trips failed to satisfy the proximate-immi-
nent-nonprogrammatic requirement of National Wildlife Federation,128
Justice Scalia's opinion went on to hold that even if the injury asserted
by the plaintiff were otherwise sufficient, the injury was not
redressable in the sense required by the case-or-controversy require-
ment of Article III. Redressability was lacking because, even if the
plaintiff received the relief that it requested-that is, if the Secretary
of the Interior adopted a regulation requiring consultation between
all agencies involved in funding foreign projects in order to minimize
jeopardy to endangered and threatened species-the other agencies
that funded foreign projects might refuse to comply with the Secre-
tary's regulation.
Even if the other agencies complied with the Secretary's regula-
tion, and foreign funding was consequently withheld, foreign govern-
ments might nevertheless decide to continue their construction
projects without United States funding. This would perpetuate the
danger to endangered and threatened species that the plaintiff sought
to eliminate, even though the plaintiff had been granted precisely the
remedy that it desired on the merits. Redress of the injury about
which the plaintiff complained was ultimately dependent upon the ac-
126 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136); see also
supra text accompanying note 19 (quoting Northeastern Forida statement of constitutional
test for standing).
127 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64.
128 See id. at 562-67.
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tions of third parties-other funding agencies and foreign govern-
ments-who were not before the Court.129
The very same third-party redressability problem was present in
Northeastern Florida. The members of the plaintiff trade association in
Northeastern Florida had not alleged or averred with particularity what
construction contracts they would have bid on in the absence of the
Jacksonville set-aside program. 30 Even if the plaintiff's members had
made particularized allegations and averments, however, the injury
that they alleged still might not have been redressed by a favorable
decision on the merits. If the Jacksonville set-aside program were in-
validated, the city might still fail to award the plaintiff's members the
contracts on which they bid. Not only did their ability to secure the
award of particular contracts depend upon the actions of theJackson-
ville municipal officials who participated in the contract-awarding pro-
cess, but the award of particular contracts ultimately depended upon
the contract bids submitted by competing contractors. Because these
competitors were third parties who were not before the Court, and
because their actions could affect whether the plaintiff's members
would be awarded a contract, their actions precluded a finding of
redressability under the terms of Lujan.131
One might sensibly argue that it is unrealistic to require absolute
redressability to satisfy the demands of Article IlI; the mere elimina-
tion of a substantial impediment to redress of the plaintiffs injury
ought to be sufficient to establish standing. Because the universe is a
complicated place, in which meaningful causal relationships are very
difficult to ascertain, the problem of determining causation has long
perplexed the legal system.13 2 Accordingly, when the law of standing
requires that an injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of
the defendant,"'33 the qualifier "fairly" indicates that something less
than absolute redressability will satisfy the demands of Article III.
However, this is the precise argument that the Court seems to have
rejected in Lujan, in which the denial of United States funding was
deemed insufficient for standing. 34 Standing was denied even
though it could "fairly" be said that the presence or absence of such
funding is likely to be a substantial factor in a foreign government's
129 See id. at 568-71.
130 * See supra part IIA.
131 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302-03 (1993); cf. Lujan, 540 U.S. at 568-71.
132 See generally Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHm.-Krr. L. REv. 397
(1987); Symposium, Causation and Financial Compensation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357 (1985).
133 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976)) (emphasis added).
134 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568-71.
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decision to proceed with a construction project in disregard of the
harm to endangered or threatened species.' 3 5
This argument has even more appeal than is initially apparent.
The meaning of a "fairly" traceable causal connection is largely inde-
terminate. As a result, supplying meaning to that term is more an act
of legislative policymaking than of judicial interpretation. Because
the causation-redressability requirement directly affects the degree to
which private enforcement actions will be used to supplement govern-
mental enforcement of a legal provision, this policy determination
should be made by a politically accountable legislature. Indeed, that
is precisely what is embodied in the zone-of-interest or "nexus" test
that the Court sometimes requires for standing in addition to the in-
jury requirement. 3 6 Congress arguably makes such a determination
when it speaks to the issue of who should have standing to enforce
particular statutes, striking the desired balance between the pros and
cons of private enforcement.
In Lujan, Congress explicitly granted standing to "any person" to
enforce the consultation provisions of the Endangered Species Act,'37
thereby indicating that Congress intended high levels of supplemental
private enforcement for the statute. Ironically, Justice Scalia's major-
ity opinion in Lujan viewed the Article III redressability requirement
as so important that it declared the statute's "citizen suit" standing
provision to be unconstitutional.'38 However, it is actually the Court's
invalidation of the "citizen suit" provision that appears to be unconsti-
tutional because it substitutes judicial for legislative policy preferences
concerning the appropriate level of supplemental private enforce-
ment for a congressional enactment. In ignoring the Article III
dimensions of the zone-of-interest or nexus inquiry-which the Court
mistakenly views as prudential rather than constitutional' 39-the
Court itself violated separation-of-powers restrictions on its exercise of
legislative power.140
135 See id. at 599-601 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136 A plaintiff is within the zone of interest of the statute or constitutional provision
that the plaintiff seeks to enforce if the drafters of that provision intended to benefit the
plaintiff. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-56 (1970); see also Spann, ExpositoryJustice supra note
1, at 638-39. Although the zone-of-interest or nexus test was initially easy to satisfy, the
Supreme Court has recently applied it with considerable stringency. See Air Courier Con-
ference v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523-25 (1991) (declining to con-
tinue assuming that Congress intended to benefit all incidental beneficiaries of its
legislation and instead demanding stronger showing of congressional intent to benefit
plaintiff whose standing was at issue).
137 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-78.
138 See id.
139 See Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164-65; Data Procesing, 397 U.S. at 154-56 (1970).
140 See Spann, ExpositoyJustice, supra note 1, at 632-47 (arguing that zone-of-interest
rather than injury test should be viewed as constitutionally compelled).
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Although one could easily disagree with the Supreme Court's de-
cision to read a stringent redressability requirement into the language
of Article III, one would still expect the Court to apply this require-
ment consistently. However, the effort that Justice Thomas made in
Northeastern Florida to distinguish the Court's prior redressability deci-
sions was both minimal and unconvincing. Justice Thomas stated sim-
ply that Northeastern Florida was distinguishable from the Court's prior
redressability decisions because it was an equal protection case.' 41 As
such, the plaintiff was not required to show that the injury it asserted
would actually be redressed through the award of the contract on which
it wished to bid, but merely that it was denied the opportunity to have
its bid considered.'42 This diluted redressability requirement resulted
from the fact that the essence of an equal protection claim is the de-
nial of the right to equal consideration. 143
Prior to Northeastern Florida, the Supreme Court had never sug-
gested that the redressability requirement applied differently to equal
protection cases. In fact, the Court had denied standing in equal pro-
tection race cases, such as Warth v. Seldin,'4 on grounds that explicitly
included insufficient causation and lack of redressability.145 More-
over, all of the equal protection cases thatJustice Thomas discussed in
Northeastern Florida were decided before the Supreme Court strength-
ened the stringency of the redressability requirement in Lujan.'4
Justice Thomas's handling of the redressability precedents in
Northeastern Florida was noticeably disingenuous. However, the real
reason that his purported distinction of those precedents fails is that
there is no analytically sound reason why equal protection cases
should be treated differently from other standing cases. Justice
Thomas reasoned that the essence of an equal protection claim was
the procedural right to equal consideration, not equal outcome.147 In a
rather remarkable sentence offered as part of his effort to distinguish
141 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1993).
142 Id.
143 See id. at 2302-03.
144 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
145 See id. at 502-08 (denying standing because of causation and redressability
problems). Justice Thomas purported to distinguish Warth on grounds of particularity, but
the plaintiffi in Warth had focused on at least one particular construction project that had
been frustrated by the defendant's challenged actions, whereas the plaintiff in Northeastern
Florida had not focused on any particular construction contracts that had been denied by
the defendant's challenged actions. See Northeastern F/orida, 113 S. Ct. at 2303-04. Warth
and other standing cases involving race are discussed more fully in part HI, infra.
146 Compare Northeastern Florida, 113S. Ct. at2302-03 (discussing cases decided between
1970 and 1989) with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). But cf Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-46 (1976) (non-equal protection case
imposing earlier version of redressability requirement in 1976).
147 See Northeastern F/orida, 113 S. Ct. at 2303-04.
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Warth, Justice Thomas asserted, "In Warth, by contrast, there was no
claim that the construction association's members could not apply for
variances and building permits on the same basis as other firms; what
the association objected to were the 'refusals by the town officials to
grant variances and permits."' 148 There is little to commend the sug-
gestion that an equal protection plaintiff has standing to challenge a
rule that prohibits the plaintiff from applying for a benefit, but not to
challenge a rule that requires the plaintiffs application to be rejected
on the merits. Prohibitions on discrimination apply with equal force
whether the discrimination occurs at the application or the award-of-
benefit stage.
Even if there were something special about abstract consideration
of an application that made denial of such consideration enough to
warrant an exception to the ordinary redressability requirement, Lu-
jan was itself a consideration case. Nothing in the Endangered Spe-
cies Act provision that the plaintiff wished to enforce required the
outcome of protecting endangered and threatened species. Rather,
the Act required interagency consultation designed to reduce the like-
lihood of harm to such species. 149 Accordingly, the Lujan plaintiff was
asking for consideration of its claim for the protection of endangered
and threatened species every bit as much as the plaintiff in Northeastern
Florida was asking for consideration of its claim for the award of a con-
tract. In terms of redressability, the two cases appear to be completely
indistinguishable. It seems irrelevant that one case involved the Equal
Protection Clause and that the other involved the Endangered Species
Act.
On a doctrinal level, the Supreme Court has recently taken great
pains to impose stringent pleading and proof requirements on plain-
tiffs who wish to establish standing. The Court has required particu-
larized pleading and proof that the plaintiffs asserted injury is
proximate and imminent.150 In addition, the Court has imposed a
stringent redressability requirement on plaintiffs who wish to establish
standing, and it has read this requirement into the case-or-controversy
provision of Article III.151 These recent requirements seem designed
to eliminate programmatic challenges to governmental actions-chal-
lenges that could alter the level of overall law enforcement that execu-
tive officials deem appropriate. Although the newly invigorated law of
standing arguably constitutes a violation of separation-of-powers prin-
ciples, entailing the judicial usurpation of legislative policymaking
148 Id. at 2304 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 515) (emphasis added in Justice Thomas's
quotation).
149 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992) (quoting pertinent
provision of Endangered Species Act).
150 See supra parts H.A & ll.B.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
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functions, the Supreme Court has not given any explicit attention to
this problem. It has, however, chosen to ignore all of these new re-
quirements in granting standing to the plaintiff in Northeastern Florida,
and it has made little effort to distinguish the applicable precedents in
doing so.
III
DISCRIMINATION PROBLEMS
Doctrinal inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's law of standing
are now so commonplace that they have become relatively uninterest-
ing.152 And the insight that the Court manipulates the law of standing
to advance judicial policy preferences has become more fatuous than
scandalous. 153 It is noteworthy, however, that among the policy pref-
erences that the current Supreme Court has chosen to pursue with its
manipulable law of standing is the policy of racial discrimination.
Although Jim Crow laws are no longer tolerated, the white majority
still secures for itself a disproportionately high percentage of societal
resources at the expense of racial minorities. Whether one focuses on
tangible assets-such as employment, income, property ownership,
and the like-or more intangible prerogatives-such as health, safety,
country club memberships, or chances of becoming a United States
Senator-the majority is statistically better off than racial
minorities. 54
Although individual victims are still likely to be granted standing
to challenge discrete acts of discrimination, discrete acts no longer
constitute the major type of racial discrimination that exists in the
United States.155 Rather than relying on atomistic acts of overt dis-
crimination to secure a disproportionate share of societal resources,
the contemporary majority now relies on systemic, structural, and
programmatic techniques of differentiation that correlate with race.
Even in the absence of overt discrimination, reliance on seemingly
neutral devices, such as standardized test scores, educational attain-
ment, and residency requirements, can divert the flow of resources
toward the majority.' 56 As a result, the contemporary problem of ra-
cial discrimination has become statistical in nature.
152 See generally authorities cited supra note 12 (discussing inconsistencies in law of
standing).
153 See generally supra note 12.
154 See SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 1, at 120-24 (documenting dispro-
portionate statistical advantage that members of the majority have over members of racial
minorities in the allocation of societal resources).
155 See id.
156 See id. at 120-24, 140-43 (discussing systemic nature of contemporary racial
discrimination).
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The Supreme Court recognized the power of statistical discrimi-
nation in its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,15 7 when it adopted a
disparate impact standard for establishing unlawful racial discrimina-
tion in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.158
In Washington v. Davis,159 however, the Court declined to adopt a simi-
lar disparate impact standard for racial discrimination alleged to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution,
preferring instead a constitutional standard that requires a showing of
discriminatory intent, rather than mere discriminatory effect.160 Never-
theless, statistically disparate impact remains relevant even to the con-
stitutional standard of discriminatory intent because an unexplained
racially disparate impact provides strong evidence of a discriminatory
motive on the part of the person or entity responsible for the dispa-
rate impact.' 6'
When one looks at the cases in which a legal challenge is lodged
against a systemic, structural, or programmatic practice, the Supreme
Court's standing decisions display a racially disparate impact. When
the plaintiff challenges a systemic practice that adversely affects the
interests of the white majority, such as an affirmative action program,
the Court tends to uphold the plaintiff's standing. But when the
plaintiff challenges a practice that adversely affects the interests of ra-
cial minorities, such as a pattern of restrictive zoning, tax subsidiza-
tion, or police misconduct, the Court tends to deny the plaintiff's
standing.
The degree of disparate impact that emerges from the Court's
racial decisions is sufficient to prove racial discrimination under the
statutory standard the Court adopted in Griggs for Title VII pur-
poses.162 Moreover, there is also sufficient evidence of the Court's dis-
criminatory intent to establish a constitutional violation under the
equal protection standard of Washington v. Davis, the Court's civil
rights decisions fortify the inference of discriminatory intent that
flows from the racially disparate impact of the Court's standing deci-
'57 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
158 See id. at 429-30.
159 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
160 See id. at 238-48.
161 See id. at 242 (stating that disparate impact can evidence discriminatory intent); see
also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (permitting inference of discriminatory intent
from racially correlated use of peremptory challenges by prosecutor); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 864 U.S. 339 (1960) (permitting inference of discriminatory intent from racially
correlated election districts); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351 (1886) (permitting infer-
ence of discriminatory intent from racially correlated administration of laundry licensing
statute). But cf. SPANN, RACE AGArNsr THE COURT, supra note 1, at 60-66 (deconstructing
distinction between intent and effects).
162 See infra part I.A.
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sions.163 In sum, the Supreme Court's law of standing fails both the
statutory and constitutional standards prohibiting racial
discrimination.
As a practical matter, of course, neither statutory nor constitu-
tional prohibitions on racial discrimination apply to the Supreme
Court. Realistically, there is no governmental body that possesses the
institutional power to enforce the Constitution against the Court.1 64
Moreover, the Court has held that the" Court itself possesses the power
to render final and dispositive interpretations of the Constitution.165
As the final constitutional arbiter, the Court is the ideal governmental
institution to accomplish the majoritarian task of diverting societal re-
sources away from racial minorities in a manner that benefits the ma-
jority. The Court can announce legal prohibitions on discrimination
and enforce them against the other branches of government in a way
that suggests a societal commitment to racial equality, but in the pro-
cess of so doing, the Court can allocate resources in a way that over-
rides the very equality that its opinions pronounce. Not only is that
what the Supreme Court has done with its racially discriminatory law
of standing, but that is the function that the Supreme Court has his-
torically served in American government.1 66
A. Standing and Disparate Impact
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 167 the Supreme Court held that em-
ployment practices governing hiring, discharge, promotion, and con-
ditions of employment violate the Title VII prohibitions on
employment discrimination if such practices have a racially disparate
impact. 68 The Court chose to adopt a discriminatory effects test
rather than a discriminatory intent test in order to prevent the white
majority from perpetuating its past advantage through prospective ra-
cial neutrality. 69 Accordingly, employment practices constitute pro-
163 See infra part III.B.
164 In theory, the President and Congress-both of whom take an oath to uphold the
Constitution-could use political methods to enforce the Constitution against the
Supreme Court. Arguably, the Civil War and the subsequent enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment granting citizenship to former black slaves constituted political correction of
a constitutional error made by the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857) (holding that blacks are not citizens within the meaning of United States Constitu-
tion). However, even accepting that such corrections are motivated by constitutional
rather than political concerns, political corrections are likely to be few and far between.
Cf SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 1, at 14-17 (discussing the political lever-
age that the representative branches have over the Supreme Court).
165 See supra note 6.
166 This is the thesis that is developed in SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note
1.
167 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
168 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31.
169 See id. at 429-30.
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hibited racial discrimination under Title VII if they have a racially
disparate impact, regardless of the employer's intent. 7 0
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's standing decisions have such a
disparate impact. In cases in which the plaintiff claims to have been
harmed by a systemic practice that has a racially discriminatory im-
pact, rather than by an isolated act of racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court has typically denied standing if the plaintiff was a
member of a racial minority group, but has granted standing if the
plaintiff was white.
1. Minority Programmatic Challenges
When minority plaintiffs challenge contemporary racial discrimi-
nation, their challenges tend to take the form of a programmatic at-
tack on a "pattern and practice" of official conduct in the
administration of a governmental program. Although the govern-
mental program is often facially neutral, the minority plaintiffs typi-
cally allege that the program has had a disparate impact that is
disproportionately adverse to racial minorities. Frequently, the mi-
nority plaintiffs assert that the program at issue is discriminatory by
design as well as in effect. 17'
Warth v. Seldin provides an example of a programmatic challenge
to official conduct filed by minority plaintiffs. There, an array of black
and latino plaintiffs filed a class action challenging a municipal zon-
ing policy that was alleged to have been racially discriminatory both in
intent and effect. 172 The plaintiffs in Warth were denied standing be-
cause they failed to satisfy the third-party redressability test' 73 that the
170 The Supreme Court subsequently reformulated its disparate impact test in a way
that made disparate impact considerably more difficult to establish. See, e.g., Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (imposing stringent new proof requirements
on plaintiffs seeking to establish disparate impact of subjective standards used in employ-
ment); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality decision
containing dicta favoring increase in plaintiff's burden of proof). These decisions, as well
as other restrictive Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII, were subsequently over-
ruled by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. V
1993)). See generally Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Theory and Practice, 68 NOTRE
DAmE L. Ruv. 911 (1993); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory Alterna-
tives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1621 (1993); Note, The Civil Rights Act
of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HAIv. L. REV. 896 (1993).
171 Although the allegation of discriminatory intent is superfluous for present pur-
poses, it does support the inference of discriminatory intent that can be drawn from dispa-
rate impact, as is discussed infra in part IILB.
172 SeeWarti v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,493-98 (1975). Note that the array of Warth plain-
tiffs also included some presumably non-minority plaintiffs who wished to construct low
income housing, live in an integrated community, and avoid the tax increases that they
alleged would result from the challenged restrictive zoning practices. See id. Nevertheless,
the nature of the case is such that it can safely be classified'as a minority plaintiff case.
173 See id. at 504-08.
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Court introduced in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.174 and later developed
with redoubled stringency in National Wildlife Federation and Lujan.'75
Warth also contained dicta linking redressability to the Article III case-
or-controversy requirement, 76 which the Court subsequently turned
into holding in Lujan.177 Although the Court did not find the equally
serious third-party redressability problem to be a basis for denying
standing in Northeastern I/orida,178 it did find the problem sufficient to
deny standing in Warth. In a very real sense, therefore, the plaintiffs
in Warth were denied standing because of the programmatic nature of
their challenge to a systemic zoning practice.
Allen v. Wright 79 is another example of the denial of standing to
maintain a programmatic challenge to systemic discrimination. In Al-
len, the parents of minority school children filed a national class ac-
tion challenging a pattern and practice of decisions made by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that, in effect, granted tax subsidies to
segregated private schools.' 80 These "subsidies" allegedly violated the
Internal Revenue Code and frustrated the plaintiffs' efforts to secure
integrated educational opportunities for their children.' 8 ' The plain-
tiffs asserted that the IRS had acquiesced in misrepresentations con-
cerning the nondiscrimination policies of many private schools by
refusing to take any action to detect false certifications of nondiscrimi-
nation, in spite of the fact that the Internal Revenue Code and IRS
regulations clearly prohibited segregated schools from acquiring tax-
exempt status.
The plaintiffs argued that by granting tax-exempt status-and the
concomitant ability to receive tax-deductible contributions-to segre-
gated schools, the IRS was both fostering support for segregated
schools and interfering with applicable school desegregation plans.' 82
After again referring to the Article III case-or-controversy require-
ment, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they
had not satisfied the causation and redressability requirements estab-
lished in cases such as Warth, and that their "injury" was a mere "gen-
174 410 U.S. 614, 614-19 (1973) (mother lacks standing to seek criminal prosecution of
father for nonpayment of child support because prosecution would punish father but
might not result in payment of child support).
175 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing National Wildlife Federation
and Lujan).
176 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-501 (containing Article In redressability dicta).
177 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992) (holding "citizen
suit" provision of Endangered Species Act unconstitutional due to Article H redressability
problems). Lujan is discussed more fully supra, notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
178 See supra part II.D (discussing redressability problems in Northeastern F/brida).
179 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
180 Id. at 739-43.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 739-47.
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eralized grievance" whose judicial resolution would implicate the
Court in separation-of-powers problems. 183 The Court rejected both
the argument that the plaintiffs were injured by the federal govern-
ment's identification with and financing of segregated education, 84
and the argument that the plaintiffs were injured in their efforts to
secure integrated educational facilities for their children. The Court
found these alleged injuries to be too abstract and speculative.' 85
Once again, the problem with the claim asserted in Allen v. Wright
appears to have been its programmatic nature. And once again the
Court's denial of standing seems to be directly at odds with the North-
eastern Florida decision, which flatly disregarded similar problems of an
abstract and speculative injury.
In a series of four police and prosecutorial misconduct cases de-
cided between 1974 and 1983, various groups of inner-city minority
residents sought injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of alleged
patterns and practices of official misconduct that were claimed to
have violated the civil rights of the minority residents. In the 1974
case, O'Shea v. Littleton,18 6 seventeen minority and two white residents
of Cairo, Illinois filed a class action alleging that local police officers,
prosecutors, and magistrates intentionally discriminated against mi-
norities and others who were engaged in civil rights activities, and that
they failed to enforce the laws adequately against whites who victim-
ized racial minorities.
The plaintiffs offered evidence of specific instances in which indi-
vidual named plaintiffs had been subjected to abusive bond-setting,
sentencing, and jury-fee practices.' 8 7 Although the Court did not ex-
pressly use the term "standing,"188 it dismissed the suit for failure to
demonstrate an Article III injury.189 The Court held that the alleged
past abuses did not establish ajusticiable claim because there was no
evidence that those abuses would be repeated against the same plain-
tiffs in the future. This is a curious response to a class-action com-
plaint that alleges a pattern and practice of ongoing misconduct. It
does, however, seem to rest on a blend of stringent standing and ripe-
183 See id. at 750-53. Although the Court devoted significant attention to the genera-
lized nature of the plaintiffs' alleged injury, it treated the generalized nature of the injury
as a prudential rather than a constitutional problem. See id. at 750-51. I have argued else-
where that the Court's alignment of prudential and constitutional tests is backwards. See
Spann, Expository Justice, supra note 1, at 632-47 (arguing that zone-of-interest rather than
injury test should be viewed as constitutionally compelled).
184 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752-56.
185 Id. at 756762.
186 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
187 Id. at 490-93.
188 The majority opinion referred to "standing" only twice, both times in footnotes. See
id. at 493 n.2, 494 n.3.
189 See id. at 493.
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ness concerns that is reminiscent of the Court's decisions in National
Wildlife Federation and Lujan.90
In Spomer v. Littleton,'9 a companion case to O'Shea, the Court
remanded the action, which the same plaintiffs had filed against the
State's Attorney, suggesting that the action was moot with respect to
the original State's Attorney, who had been replaced in a recent elec-
tion, and unripe with respect to the new State's Attorney, who had not
done anything to harm the plaintiffs.192 Obviously, the Court's deter-
mination that the injury alleged in a pattem-and-practice case can be
both moot and unripe makes it difficult to maintain such suits; the
window through which an injury that qualifies for standing purposes is
permitted to pass is very narrow.'93 In 1976 the O'Shea holding was
reaffirmed in Rizzo v. Goode,194 a case in which a class of Philadelphia
residents filed two suits against the Mayor and the Police Commis-
sioner of Philadelphia, alleging a pattern and practice of racially dis-
criminatory and abusive police misconduct. 95 Once again, the Court
found that the plaintiffs had not sustained an Article III injury, for the
reasons stated in O'Shea.'9 6
In 1981 the Court decided City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,197 where a
minority victim of a "chokehold" applied by a Los Angeles police of-
ficer sued to enjoin continued implementation of a police depart-
ment policy that allegedly authorized the use of chokeholds in an
unlawful and racially discriminatory manner.198 Citing O'Shea and
Rizzo, the Court held that the plaintiff suffered no Article III injury.199
Once again, the Court's unmistakable hostility to programmatic po-
lice misconduct challenges stands in marked contrast to the Court's
receptivity to the equally programmatic affirmative action challenge
that it permitted in Northeastern Florida.
190 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing National Wildlife Federation
and Lujan).
191 414 U.S. 514 (1974).
192 Id. at 519-23.
193 It is also interesting to note that the basis of the Court's determination of moomess
in Spomer-that is, the election of a new prosecutor who might not continue the alleged
abuses-was very similar to the reason that Northeastern Florida appears to have been
moot-that is, the "election" of a new affirmative action program that might not continue
the alleged abuses. Nevertheless, in Spomer the minority plaintiff was denied relief on
mootness grounds, but in Northeastern Forida, the white plaintiff was not. Compare Spomer,
414 U.S. at 519-23 with Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v.
City ofJacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2300-01 (1993).
194 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
195 See id. at 366-70.
196 See id. at 371-73.
197 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
198 See id. at 97-100; cf. id. at 115-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing racially
discriminatory nature of alleged chokehold policy).
199 Id. at 101-04.
1458 [Vol. 80:1422
COLOR-CODED STANDING
2. Majority Programmatic Challenges
When racial discrimination claims are asserted by members of the
white majority, they tend to take the form of programmatic challenges
to affirmative action plans that have been voluntarily adopted, agreed
to as part of a consent decree, or imposed as part of a remedial judi-
cial order. Northeastern Florida exemplifies this type of challenge,
which has become ubiquitous with the increased political conserva-
tism of the Supreme Court.
A challenge to an affirmative action program is programmatic in
the same way that a minority challenge to a pattern and practice of
official conduct is programmatic. Although a plaintiff challenging an
affirmative action plan is at least nominally interested in personal re-
lief, it is the systemic nature of the challenge that gives the case its
societal importance. To suggest that affirmative action challenges are
important because of the particularized impact that they will have on
the plaintiff is like suggesting that Brown v. Board of Education was im-
portant because it said that Linda Brown could attend a desegregated
elementary school in Topeka, Kansas.2 00
The frequency with which the Supreme Court considers affirma-
tive action challenges is testimony to the systemic significance with
which those challenges are vested. It appears that the Supreme Court
grants certiorari in those cases so that it can formulate and announce
its evolving policy concerning the appropriate nature and scope of
affirmative action programs. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the
Court has entertained challenges to affirmative action programs even
when they have become moot as to the plaintiff filing the chal-
lenge,201 and even when the affirmative action conflict that the Court
wished to address has had no effect on the plaintiff whatsoever. 202
200 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954).
201 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2301 (rejecting claim of moomess despite re-
peal and replacement of challenged program). The moomess issue in Northeastern Florida
is discussed more fully above. See supra part I.B. But seeDeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
315-20 (1974) (rejecting affirmative action challenge on grounds of moomess).
202 See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (resolving con-
flict between affirmative action and seniority where no such conflict existed, because all
affected workers had same seniority and pertinent decisions were made alphabetically--a
fact that the Court did not disclose in its opinion); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Simple
Justice, 73 GEO. LJ. 1041, 1046, 1068 (1985) (discussing alphabetical rather than seniority
basis of Stotts). New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse has suggested
that the present Supreme Court has been so anxious to overrule liberal precedents in cases
having both direct and indirect racial overtones that the Court has repeatedly granted
review in cases having procedural or technical problems that will make it difficult for the
Court to issue useful rulings on the merits of those cases. See Linda Greenhouse, Detours on
the Road to Legal Precedents, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 12, 1995, § 4, at 3 (discussing questionable
grants of review in Missouri v. Jenkins, a school desegregation case, Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, an affirmative action case, and Anderson v. Green, a welfare restriction case).
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Since 1974, when the Court began considering affirmative action
cases outside of the school desegregation context, it has decided
eighteen racial affirmative action cases.20 3 Fourteen of these cases
raised constitutional challenges to an affirmative action program
under the Equal Protection Clause.20 4 Four of the cases concerned
statutory challenges under Title VII.2 0 5 Eleven of the challenges arose
in the employment context, disputing the allocation of contracts, pro-
motions, or layoffs.206 Other challenges have been made to educa-
tional affirmative action programs,20 7 remedial voting rights plans, 208
and broadcast license preference programs.20 9
The Court's resolution of the merits of these affirmative action
challenges has not been uniform. Sometimes the Court has declined
to reach the merits;210 sometimes the Court has upheld the chal-
203 The 18 affirmative action cases are Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995);
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993); Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989);Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987);
Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28
of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); UnitedJewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
The Court has also decided a series of cases under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(1988)). See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct.
2581 (1994); Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075
(1993). Although these cases technically constitute affirmative action cases, because they
decrease white voting strength in order to enhance minority voting strength, the voting
rights cases that have been decided on statutory rather than constitutional grounds are
numerous, complex, and beyond the scope of the present discussion.
204 The 14 cases raising constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans are Miller,
Hayr, Adarand; Shaw, Northeastern Flonida Metro Broadcasting Croson; Paradise Sheet Metal
Workers; Wygant Fullilove Bakke, United Jewish Organizations, and DeFunis.
205 The four Title VII cases are Johnson; International Ass'n of Firefighter, Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784; and United Steel Workers.
206 The 11 cases that arose in an employment context are Adarand Northeastem Florida;
Croson; Johnson; Paradise, International Ass'n of Firefighters, Sheet Metal Workerr, Wygant;
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784; Fullilove and United Steel Workers.
207 The two cases that arose in an educational context are Bakke and DeFunis.
208 The four cases that arose in a remedial voting rights context are Miller, Hays;, Shar,
and United Jewish Organizations.
209 The case that arose in the context of a preferential broadcast license program is
Metro Broadcasting.
210 The Court dismissed one constitutional challenge to a law school affirmative action
program on mootness grounds rather than ruling on the merits. See DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974). The Court dismissed one challenge to a voter reapportionment plan
for lack of standing. See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). In addition, the
Court addressed only the issue of standing in Northeastern Forida, remanding the case for
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lenged plans;21' and sometimes the Court has invalidated the chal-
lenged plans.2 12 However, the Court's resolution of the plaintiffs'
standing has been strikingly consistent. In virtually every affirmative
action case, the white plaintiff has been accorded standing to chal-
lenge the affirmative action program at issue.213
3. Racially Disparate Impact
In cases in which the plaintiff claims to have been harmed by a
systemic practice that has had a racially discriminatory impact, rather
than by an isolated act of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court's
tendency has been to grant standing if the plaintiff was white or was
challenging a practice alleged to have adversely affected the interests
of the white majority. On the other hand, it has tended to deny stand-
ing if the plaintiff was a member of a racial minority group or was
challenging a practice that was alleged to have adversely affected the
resolution of the merits. SeeNortheastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors
v. City ofJacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2305 (1993).
211 The Court upheld the challenged affirmative action programs in five of the consti-
tutional cases: Metro Broadcasting Paradise Sheet Metal Workers, Fullilove; and United Jewish
Organizations. In addition, the Court upheld affirmative action plans in two Title VII cases:
International Ass'n of Firefighters and United Steel Workers.
212 The Court invalidated the affirmative action programs presented in six of the con-
stitutional cases: Mille, Adarand; Shaw Croson; Wygant and Bakke In addition, in Firefight-
ers Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), the Court rejected an expansive
interpretation of a Title VII consent decree in order to protect seniority rights, which the
Court found to be entitled to greater protection under Title VII than race. See id. at 572-
73.
213 The only case challenging the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan in
which the Court dismissed the white plaintiffs' case for lack of standing was United States v.
Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995), where the Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they did not live in the voting district whose reapportionment they had chal-
lenged. However, in the companion case of Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), the
Court upheld the standing of white plaintiffs to make the same challenge to the reappor-
tionment of the district in which they did reside. This renders the standing restriction in
Hays a technicality rather than a meaningful impediment to the ability of white plaintiffs to
challenge affirmative action reapportionment plans. The Supreme Court mentioned
standing in only four of the remaining affirmative action challenges. In Northeastern Flor-
ida, standing was the central issue before the Court. However, in the factually similar Fulli-
love decision, the Court mentioned standing only once, in a foomote. SeeFullilove, 448 U.S.
at 480-81 n.71. Ironically, the Fullilove footnote stressed that the plaintiffs had identified
three specific examples of contracts that the plaintiff's members would have been awarded
but for the affirmative action program. See id. No such allegation was made in Northeastern
Forida. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92 (discussing plaintiff's failure to identify
particular contracts that would have been awarded to plaintiff s members absent minority
set-aside). In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, a concurring opinion made a general
reference to standing in one sentence of one footnote. See UnitedJewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at
180 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring in thejudgment). The most extensive standing discussion
is contained in Bakke, in which the Court devoted a three paragraph footnote to the issue.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14. Justice Thomas relies heavily on this footnote in his
Northeastern Korida opinion. See Northeastern Forida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302-03. Although the
Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of standing in DeFunis, it did dismiss the case on
mootness grounds. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 315-20.
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interests of a racial minority group. In all six of the cases referred to
above, in which a minority plaintiff asserted a programmatic challenge
to a pattern and practice of discriminatory conduct that adversely af-
fected a racial minority, the minority plaintiff was denied standing on
grounds relating to the generalized nature of the asserted injury or
problems relating to the proximity, imminence, or redressability of
the injury.214 However, in seventeen of the eighteen affirmative ac-
tion cases referred to above, in which a white plaintiff asserted a
programmatic challenge to a pattern and practice of conduct that ad-
versely affected the white majority, the plaintiff was granted standing
despite the generalized nature of the asserted injury and despite
problems relating to proximity, imminence, or redressability.2 15
The correlation between race and standing may not be perfect.
For example, in the affirmative action cases-other than Northeastern
Florida-in which the plaintiff was granted standing to maintain a
challenge to an affirmative action plan, standing was rarely focused
upon as an issue in the case.2 16 As a result, it may be unfair to com-
pare cases in which standing was tacitly assumed and cases in which
standing was expressly denied; the Court may simply not have focused
on the issue in the tacit standing cases.
Even assuming, however, that the Court's focus on the standing
issue was sporadic, the Court's inconsistent emphasis on standing may
fortify the proposition that the Court is making discriminatory use of
the doctrine. The Court's selective attention to standing may estab-
lish that, despite their doctrinal similarities, white plaintiff pattern-
and-practice cases are not even considered to be cases in which stand-
ing could realistically pose a significant problem, whereas minority
plaintiff pattern-and-practice cases are cases in which standing can be
fatal.217
Most of the Court's affirmative action cases were decided before
1990, when the Court began to increase standing requirements in
programmatic challenge cases, thereby rendering the earlier affirma-
tive action challenge cases arguably inapposite.218 However, once the
Court did begin to increase the stringency of its standing require-
ments, Northeastern Florida indicates that standing was recognized to be
214 See supra part I.A..
215 See supra part IIIA2.
216 See supra note 213 (discussing limited consideration of standing issue in affirmative
action challenge cases).
217 The cursory nature of the consideration accorded the issue of standing, even when
the issue is addressed in the affirmative action challenge cases, lends some support to this
view. See supra note 213 (discussing limited consideration of standing issue in affirmative
action challenge cases).
218 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing post-1990 standing deci-
sions in National Wildlife Federation and Lujan).
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an issue in cases challenging affirmative action programs, but that
standing for white plaintiffs would nevertheless be upheld.21 9
Another factor that may dilute the correlation between race and
standing stems from the cases that I have not discussed. I have fo-
cused upon the pattern-and-practice race cases in which minority
plaintiffs were denied standing, but I have not mentioned the cases in
which standing was granted-such as the many school desegregation
cases in which the Court routinely assumed standing for minority
school children.220 Although those cases are technically ones in
which individual plaintiffs challenged discrete acts of discrimination
committed through the denial of particular educational benefits, real-
istically the cases are institutional, systemic, programmatic, pattern-
and-practice cases because segregated school systems must be inte-
grated in order to provide the plaintiffs any meaningful relief. This
makes the school desegregation cases seem as relevant as the affirma-
tive action cases in which standing was also tacitly granted.
Although standing for black plaintiffs was traditionally assumed
in the early school desegregation cases, if one focuses more precisely
on cases that have been decided since the Court began to use stand-
ing as a restrictive rather than an expansive doctrine, a racially dispa-
rate impact once again emerges. Most of the school desegregation
cases in which the Court has tacitly granted standing were decided
before the Supreme Court began its vigorous reformulation of restric-
219 Cf. United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) (denying standing to white plain-
tiffs in Voting Rights Act case who did not live in challenged district). But see Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (upholding standing of white plaintiff in Voting Rights Act
case who did live in challenged district).
220 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown v. Board of
Educ. (Brown 17), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), required race-conscious remedies in order to
achieve the desegregation of previously segregated school systems "with all deliberate
speed." Subsequent cases emphasized that contemplated desegregation strategies had to
be effective in order to be acceptable. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1969); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968);
Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1964). In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court explicitly authorized the use of
race-based pupil assignments as a permissible remedy for prior constitutional violations.
See id. at 27-28. ChiefJustice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, also endorsed-albeit
reluctantly-the use of mathematical ratios reflecting racial proportionality in the school
district population as targets in formulating desegregation plans to remedy constitutional
violations, and did so in the face of a congressional statute that arguably prohibited mak-
ing pupil assignments for the purpose of achieving racial balance. See id. at 16-18, 22-25.
In a companion case, North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971), the Court held that a prohibition on race-based pupil assignments in favor of col-
orblind pupil assignments was also unconstitutional because it interfered with the school
board's ability to fashion an effective remedy for past segregation. See id. at 45-46. In each
of these cases, the Supreme Court assumed without discussion that the plaintiffs had stand-
ing to maintain the desegregation suits.
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ive standing rules in 1990.221 Now that standing has become a more
frequent tool for Supreme Court policymaking, restrictive standing
cases such as Allen v. Wright are more representative of the Court's
present posture toward minority plaintiff, programmatic, school de-
segregation challenges,222 whereas permissive standing cases such as
Northeastern lorida are more representative of the Court's present pos-
ture toward white plaintiff, programmatic, affirmative action
challenges.
The Supreme Court sometimes grants standing to a minority
plaintiff after having denied standing to a similar plaintiff in a prior
case. For example, although the Court denied standing to minority
plaintiffs in Warth v. Seldin?23 when they challenged racially restrictive
zoning practices, two years later it granted standing to similarly-situ-
ated minority plaintiffs in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,224 despite the apparent lack of distinction
between the two cases.2 25 In addition, there is undoubtedly a host of
other race discrimination cases that can be fairly characterized as
221 See supra text accompanying notes 34-45 (discussing post-1990 standing decisions in
National Wildlife Federation and Lujan).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 179-85 (discussing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984)). But see United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (holding that Mississippi
college system with racially identifiable schools remained dual rather than unitary despite
racially unrestricted choice given to students in selecting schools). It is worth noting that,
in Fordice, Justice Thomas interpreted the majority opinion as permitting the intentional
perpetuation of historically black colleges. See id. at 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring).
223 422 U.S. 490, 502-18 (1975).
224 429 U.S. 252, 260-64 (1977).
225 The only difference between Arlington Heights and Warth seems to be that Arlington
Heights concerned a suburb of Chicago, see Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 254-60, whereas
Warth concerned a suburb of Rochester, see Warth, 422 U.S. at 493-98. The Arlington Heights
opinion attempted a half-hearted distinction of Warth by focusing on a particular housing
project contemplated by one of the plaintiffs in Arlington Heights. See Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 260-64. Warth too involved a particular housing project, but the Warth Court simply
disregarded that project, speculating, without any basis in the record, that it might have
become stale during the course of the litigation. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 514-17.
The Arlington Heights Court's treatment of the Article III case-or-controversy issue was
even more remarkable. With respect to the newly articulated nonspeculativeness, causa-
tion, and redressability requirements, Justice Powell's opinion stated:
An injunction [the requested relief] would not, of course, guarantee that
Lincoln Green [the contemplated project] will be built. MHDC [the plain-
tiff] would still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, and
carry through with construction. But all housing developments are subject
to some extent to similar uncertainties. When a project is as detailed and
specific as Lincoln Green, a court is not required to engage in undue spec-
ulation as a predicate for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite per-
sonal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an injury to itself that is
"likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261-62 (footnote omitted) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). The whole point of Warth was, of course, that the
Court was required to engage in precisely such speculation in order to uphold a plaintiff's
standing. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-517.
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programmatic and in which the Court proceeded to decide the mer-
its, without ever considering standing to be an issue. For example, in
Swain v. Alabama226 and Batson v. Kentucky,227 the Court considered
the constitutionality of racially motivated uses of peremptory chal-
lenges in criminal cases without discussing standing, and in McClesky v.
Kemp,228 the Court likewise considered the merits of the plaintiffs
claim that the death penalty was being implemented in a racially dis-
criminatory manner without treating standing as an issue.
One could attempt to dispute the relevance of many of the
programmatic cases in which the Court reached the merits without
addressing the issue of standing. In McClesky, for example, the reason
the Court offered for rejecting the plaintiff's discrimination claim on
the merits was that the claim was a systemic claim rather than a claim
of particularized discrimination, thereby making the case more consis-
tent than inconsistent with my present thesis.229 Moreover, as has
been discussed, it is unclear how much weight should be given to a
case in which the Court upholds standing without recognizing stand-
ing to be an issue, precisely because the Court failed to focus on the
programmatic nature of the challenge that was before it.2 30 Rather
than dispute the relevance of the tacit standing cases, however, it
seems preferable to concede that the Court has sometimes decided
programmatic discrimination cases on the merits even when the plain-
tiffs were minority plaintiffs.
Even if the correlation between race and standing is not perfect,
it does exist. In light of the uniform success that white plaintiffs have
had in establishing standing to challenge affirmative action programs,
compared to the frequent lack of success that minority plaintiffs have
had in pursuing their programmatic challenges, it is difficult to imag-
ine anyone seriously disputing the fact that the Court is much more
likely to reject a programmatic racial discrimination challenge on
standing grounds when the plaintiff is a minority plaintiff than when
the plaintiff is white. And that correlation is certainly sufficient to cre-
ate a suspicion of discriminatory treatment that the Supreme Court
would be expected to explain away if it wished to refute charges of
discrimination.
226 380 U.S. 202, 221-24 (1965) (rejecting on merits claim that discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges violates Equal Protection Clause).
227 476 U.S. 79, 93-98 (1986) (upholding on merits claim that discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges violates Equal Protection Clause).
228 481 U.S. 279, 291-99 (1987) (rejecting on merits claim that Georgia death penalty
statute was discriminatorily applied more frequently to those convicted of killing white
victims than to those convicted of killing black victims).
229 See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 292-97.
230 See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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4. Exacerbating Rationales
In Northeastern F/orida, Justice Thomas demonstrated an awareness
of the decisions that have created a racially correlated disparate im-
pact in the law of standing to maintain programmatic challenges to
official actions. He twice cited Allen v. Wright,231 relied heavily on Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke,232 and attempted to distin-
guish Warth v. Seldin.233 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas's overall effort
to explain the Court's departure from its recent standing precedents
was minimal. His reading of Bakke as the controlling precedent simply
disregarded the Court's post-1990 standing jurisprudence-which his
opinion purported to follow234-and relied on a simplistic and unten-
able interpretation of the case.2 35 Moreover, Justice Thomas's prof-
fered distinction of Warth seems more silly than serious, 236 and
borders on dishonesty.2 37 In the final analysis, the cavalier treatment
that he accorded the issue of standing in Northeastern Florida seems to
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the racially disparate impact of the
Court's standing decisions.
Justice Thomas began the standing portion of Northeastern Florida
with a lack of care that conveys an absence of concern about the ra-
cially charged dimension of his undertaking. In his statement of the
controlling law, Justice Thomas conflated the "injury in fact" and the
"legal interest" tests for standing as if they were identical, rather than
dramatically different. 238 This reveals an incomplete understanding
of the shift induced by the Administrative Procedure Act from the pre-
New Deal "legal interest" regime to the post-New Deal "injury-in-fact"
approach to standing.2 39
231 See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301-02 (1993) (citing Allen v. Wright, 469 U.S. 737, 750, 752
(1984)).
232 See id. at 2302-03.
233 See id. at 2303-04.
234 See id. at 2301-02 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136
(1992), as stating applicable law of standing).
235 See id. at 2302-03 (discussing Bakke without reference to redressability
requirement).
236 See id. at 2303-04. Justice Thomas attempted to distinguish Warth by suggesting that
the Warth plaintiffs lacked standing because they alleged merely that their applications for
zoning variances were denied on racial grounds. If they had instead alleged that their appli-
cations were rejected on racial grounds, as did the plaintiffs in Northeastern Florida, then they
would have had standing. See id. at 2304.
237 See supra notes 145 (discussing attempted distinction of Warth on grounds of partic-
ularity), 225 (discussing problems with attempted distinction of Warth on grounds of
particularity).
238 See Northeastern F/orida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302 (defining "injury in fact" to mean "an
invasion of a legally protected interest").
239 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing difference between "legal
interest" and "injury in fact" tests).
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In stating the applicable standing test, Justice Thomas quoted the
language ofJustice Scalia's opinion in Lujan that precludes program-
matic challenges to governmental actions by insisting on particular-
ized showings of imminence, proximity, causation, and redressability
to establish an Article Ill injury.240 However, after quoting Justice
Scalia's restrictive approach to standing, Justice Thomas proceeded to
discuss the issue of standing for the white plaintiff in Northeastern Flor-
ida as if he were applying the expansive law of standing to which the
Court adhered during the injury-in-fact era of the early 1970s, 24 1
rather than the restrictive law of the post-1990 Scalia era.242 He accom-
plished this by according liberal interpretations to the pleadings and
minimal significance to the redressability difficulties that arise under
the facts of the case-things that the Supreme Court has not done in
minority plaintiff cases or in its post-1990 cases other than Northeastern
Florida.
The reason that Justice Thomas gave for dispensing with the
stringent redressability requirement was that Northeastern Florida was
an equal protection case, and that in equal protection cases the plain-
tiff need only demonstrate a failure to compete or a failure to be consid-
ered for a benefit on equal terms in order to establish standing.243 In
support of this proposition, Justice Thomas relied heavily on Bakke,
which permitted a disappointed white medical school applicant to
challenge the affirmative action program adopted by the University of
California at Davis Medical School without requiring the applicant to
demonstrate that he would have been admitted to the school had the
affirmative action plan not been in effect. 244
There are several problems with this assertion. One problem is
that it is merely an assertion; Justice Thomas did not attempt to ex-
plain why equal protection cases should be different from other cases
in which standing has been denied for redressability reasons. He
merely cited Bakke as establishing this proposition.2 45 A bare citation
to authority might be an adequate basis for decision in some circum-
stances, but it is insufficient for the resolution of a controversial issue
in the constantly shifting context of standing, especially when the
240 See id. at 2801-02 (quoting Lujan test). This statement of the law is quoted above.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 20-32 (discussing injury-in-fact cases).
242 See supra text accompanying notes 34-45 (discussing post-1990 cases).
243 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302-03; see also supra notes 141-48 and accom-
panying text.
244 See Northeaster Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280-81 n.14 (1978) (Powell,J.)). Although Bakke was a plurality deci-
sion, this portion ofJustice Powell's opinion was joined by five justices. See Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 272.
245 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302-03.
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Court's resolution goes against the grain of the Court's most recent
precedents.
Another problem with Justice Thomas's bare citation to Bakke is
that standing was hardly a central issue in that case. The primary par-
ties did not raise the issue. Although the Court considered standing
in response to an amicus argument, the Bakke discussion of the issue
was relegated to a mere three paragraph footnote, of which only one
paragraph addressed the issue of redressability.246 Moreover, in that
discussion of redressability, the Court appeared more to be deferring
to a trial court finding of fact that the plaintiff suffered an injury in-
dependent of his inability to be admitted to medical school, than to
be announcing a principle of standing jurisprudence. 247
Viewing the Northeastern Florida opinion most favorably to Justice
Thomas, the reason that the Supreme Court found standing in Bakke
is that Bakke was decided in 1978, prior to the Supreme Court's Scalia-
inspired hardening of the doctrine in the post-1990 cases.2 48 How-
ever, even if this interpretation saves Bakke from characterization as a
racially motivated decision, it still establishes nothing more than that
Bakke arose in the twilight of the Court's permissive era of standing.249
It does not provide reliable authority for granting standing in the
Court's post-1990 restrictive era.
The conclusory nature of Justice Thomas's assertion that equal
protection cases are different from other standing cases is troubling
not only because he appeared to give the proposition little attention,
but because the proposition also appears to be wrong. If there is
something special about equal protection cases, it must be that the
denial of fair or nondiscriminatory consideration of an application for a
246 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14. Justice Thomas did cite three additional deci-
sions concerning the right to hold public office in support of his holding. Quinn v. Mill-
sap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); and Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346 (1970). See Northeastern F/orida, 113 S. Ct. at 2302-03. However, these three
citations are just as cursory as the Bakke citation. In Turner v. Fouche, where the plaintiff
challenged a "freeholder" requirement for school board membership, the Court asserted
in one sentence of one foomote that the "contention that no appellant has standing to
raise this claim is without merit." Turner, 396 U.S. at 362 n.23. In Quinn v. Milisap, the
Court devoted one textual paragraph and one footnote paragraph to the issue of standing,
although it ultimately did nothing more than cite Turner for the proposition that plaintiffs
who do not own property have standing to challenge freeholder requirements for public
office. See Quinn, 491 U.S. at 103. Finally, Clements v. Fashingwas a ripeness case in which
the Court held that public officials could challenge a requirement that they resign from
one office before running for another, even though they had not yet announced their
candidacy for the second office. In the course of its one-page discussion, the Court in-
cluded a reference to Turner in a string cite. See Clements, 457 U.S. at 961-62.
247 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 n.14 (second paragraph).
248 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing post-1990 standing
decisions).
249 See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text (discussing emergence of the Court's
speculativeness, causation, and redressability requirements).
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benefit is important in a way that is independent from receipt of the
benefit itself. However, neither fairness nor nondiscrimination is ulti-
mately able to sustain a claim that the Equal Protection Clause is spe-
cial for standing purposes.
If the independent importance of considering an application for
a benefit stems from the need for fair consideration, it is difficult to
see how the Equal Protection Clause is relevant. Although one might
well favor standing to protect the process-based goal of ensuring pro-
cedural regularity, that goal will be present in equal protection and
non-equal protection cases alike. The members of the plaintiff trade
association in Northeastern Florida may have been denied their proce-
dural right to adequate consideration if their bids were improperly
rejected, 250 but the plaintiffs in Lujan were also denied their proce-
dural right to adequate consideration if their claims for interagency
consultation were improperly rejected. 251 The procedural defect
exists regardless of whether the provision being violated is the Equal
Protection Clause or the Endangered Species Act. Accordingly, there
is nothing special about the Equal Protection Clause that merits spe-
cial treatment for standing purposes if the goal being pursued is the
goal of procedural fairness or adequate consideration. This goal,
therefore, cannot be what caused Justice Thomas to view equal protec-
tion cases as special for standing purposes.
If the goal that merits special treatment of standing under the
Equal Protection Clause is the goal of nondiscrimination, Justice
Thomas's claim has more facial plausibility, but it is still seriously vul-
nerable. Justice Thomas might have argued that, in addition to serv-
ing the procedural goal of adequate consideration, the Equal
Protection Clause serves the substantive goal of prohibiting impermis-
sible discrimination. This goal is frustrated when adequate considera-
tion is denied on racially discriminatory grounds, as it was in
Northeastern Florida, but it is not frustrated when adequate considera-
tion is denied on nondiscriminatory, political, or economic grounds,
as it was in Lujan. Therefore, equal protection cases should be treated
differently for standing purposes because the denial of adequate con-
sideration constitutes a substantive injury that is not present when a
legal provision other than the Equal Protection Clause is alleged to
have been violated.
This argument is vulnerable to the response that other legal pro-
visions-even purely procedural ones such as the Endangered Species
Act-also vest substantive rights in the beneficiaries of their procedural
guarantees. Under the Endangered Species Act, for example, envi-
250 The facts of Northeastern Forida are discussed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 46, 56-61.
251 The facts of Lujan are discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 59-45.
1995] 1469
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ronmentalists who wish to view endangered species have a substantive
interest in whatever increased level of endangered species protection
will result from the procedural guarantees of the statute. After all, the
whole point of congressional enactment of the Endangered Species
Act was presumably to increase extant levels of protection for endan-
gered species. To the extent thatJustice Thomas's equal-protection-is-
special argument depends on a distinction between substance and
procedure, the argument can never be more satisfying than the dis-
tinction on which it rests.252
But the primary problem with the argument is that, even if valid,
it is ultimately unhelpful. At best, the argument that special standing
rules should apply in equal protection cases enables Justice Thomas to
distinguish Northeastern Florida from cases such as Lujan, where race*
was not an issue. In cases where race is an issue, however-the cases
that are relevant to the present disparate impact analysis-the Equal
Protection Clause is a constant, not a variable that serves as a basis for
distinction. By hypothesis, any case in which the plaintiff initiates a
programmatic challenge to official governmental conduct on the
grounds that the conduct is racially discriminatory can be formulated
as an equal protection challenge. 253 This reformulation would make
standing liberally available in all such cases without recourse to draco-
nian redressability requirements, and analysis of the pertinent stand-
ing cases would then reveal no racially disparate impact. But that is
not what has happened; programmatic challenge cases do show a ra-
cially disparate impact, and they show this disparate impact despite Jus-
tice Thomas's purported special treatment of equal protection
claims.254
252 The distinction between substance and procedure has been recognized as tenuous.
See, e.g., Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Micu.J.L. RE. 561, 566-72 (1988);
see also Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and
-Procedure" in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1012, 1012-13; Laura Cooper, Statutes of
Limitations in Minnesota Choice of Law: The Problematic Return of the Substance-ProcedureDistinc-
tion, 71 MiNN. L. Ra-. 363, 371-77 (1986).
253 Some minority plaintiff programmatic challenge cases, such as Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975), and the police misconduct cases, are naturally structured as equal protec-
tion cases. Other cases, such as Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), are naturally struc-
tured as statutory violation cases, but they could easily be reformulated as equal protection
cases by emphasizing constitutional rather than statutory constraints on the challenged
official conduct. See supra part III.A1 (discussing minority plaintiff programmatic chal-
lenge cases).
254 Justice Thomas also suggested that the reason the redressability requirement was
more potent in Warth than in Northeastern Florida was because the allegations of redressable
injury were not challenged by the defendant in Northeastern F/orida the way they were in
Warth. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2304 (1993). As has been noted, this argument ignores the jurisdic-
tional nature of the redressability requirement, which makes acquiescence of the parties
irrelevant. See supra note 92. However, even if the argument were more tenable, it would
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The imposing presence of the Supreme Court's earlier decision
in Warth v. Seldin forced Justice Thomas to confront, this flaw in his
equal protection argument.255 Warth was an explicit equal protection
challenge to a pattern and practice of restrictive zoning actions.256 As
a result, the special standing rules for equal protection cases, on
which Justice Thomas relied in order to distinguish Northeastern Florida
from the redressability demands of the post-1990 cases such as Lujan,
should have been available to permit standing for the plaintiffs in
Warth.
Because the Warth plaintiffs were denied standing, Justice
Thomas had to find a way to distinguish the two cases. After conced-
ing that there was "undoubtedly some tension" between Warth and the
other equal protection standing cases on which he had relied to find
standing in Northeastern Florida,257 justice Thomas offered two bases
for distinguishing Warth. First, he argued that in Warth the plaintiffs
were not complaining about the inability to have their applications for
zoning variances considered the way that the plaintiffs in other equal
protection cases like Bakke were. Rather, the plaintiffs in Warth were
complaining about the failure to have their applications granted. Be-
cause there is no difference between consideration when the outcome
is preordained and no consideration at all, this argument is famous.
Recognizing the tenuous nature of his distinction between appli-
cations that are never considered and applications that are automati-
cally denied, Justice Thomas immediately retreated to his fallback
argument. Even if the Warth plaintiffs had alleged a discriminatory
refusal to consider their applications, they still lacked standing be-
cause they had not alleged the existence of any particular construc-
tion project that was being prevented by the alleged discriminatory
acts. 258 This second argument is simply untrue, and Justice Thomas's
assertion of it seems dishonest. As has been discussed,259 there was a
particular construction project at issue in Warth-the Court simply
chose to disregard it as too stale.260 Whether one believes the sincer-
still amount to a mere technicality, rather than ajustification for a pattern of racially dispa-
rate standing results.
255 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (attempting to distinguish Warth).
256 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 493.
257 See Northeastern Florida, 113 S. Ct. at 2304.
258 See id.
259 See supra notes 145 & 225 (discussing particular housing construction project
that-despite Court's contrary assertion-was at issue in Warth).
260 To compound this apparent disingenuity, Justice Thomas went on to assert that
"[an allegation that a 'specific project' was 'precluded' by the existence or administration
of the zoning ordinance would certainly have been sufficient to establish standing, but
there is no suggestion in Warth that it was necessary." Northeastern Forida, 113 S. Ct. at 2304
(citation omitted). The whole point of Warth was, of course, that identification of a spe-
cific project was precisely what was necessary. See supra note 225 (discussing presence of
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ity of the Court's assertion or not, the Warth plaintiffs' identification
of even a "stale" project did more to establish redressability than did
the total absence of any identified contract in Northeastern Florida.261
The outcomes of the Supreme Court's standing inquiries in
programmatic challenges to allegedly racially discriminatory govern-
ment conduct vary according to the race of the plaintiff. When the
plaintiff is white or advocates the interests of the white majority, the
Court grants standing despite the programmatic nature of the chal-
lenge, which the current Supreme Court has generally taken pains to
exclude from judicial cognizance. When the plaintiff is a member of a
racial minority, however, or advocates the interests of a racial minor-
ity, the Court will deny standing on the ground that nonredressable
generalized grievances and programmatic challenges are notjudicially
cognizable, but are better left to the political branches for resolution.
Justice Thomas's attempt in Northeastern Florida to account for this
racially disparate impact is so minimal and so disingenuous that it ex-
acerbates rather than reduces the damage done by the Court's deci-
sions. This disparate impact would alone be sufficient to establish a
prima facie violation of the Title VII statutory prohibitions on racial
discrimination-if such antidiscrimination provisions applied to the
Supreme Court. But of course these antidiscrimination provisions do
not apply to the Supreme Court, and thus, the Court is free to engage
in conduct that has a racially disparate impact.
B. Standing and Intentional Discrimination
In Washington v. Davis,2 62 the Supreme Court adopted a discrimi-
natory intent test for equal protection purposes, refusing to apply the
disparate impact standard that it had previously adopted under Tire
VII.263 The Court did not offer much explanation as to why the dispa-
rate impact standard used in Tide VII cases was inappropriate for con-
stitutional cases asserting an equal protection violation. It merely
stated that the use of an effects test for equal protection purposes
would jeopardize the legality of a wide range of governmental actions,
and that the decision to impose an effects test rather than an intent
test was legislative rather than judicial in nature.264
Nevertheless, the decision did establish that, for constitutional
purposes, official action having a racially discriminatory effect does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is also motivated by a
particular housing construction project as distinguishing factor between Warth and Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
261 See supra part II.D (discussing redressability problem in Northeastern Florida).
262 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
263 See id. at 238-48.
264 See id. at 248.
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racially discriminatory intent. However, an unexplained racially dispa-
rate impact can itself be compelling evidence of discriminatory in-
tent.265 If the Washington v. Davis intentional discrimination standard
were applied to the Supreme Court's standing decisions, the Court
would be found to have engaged in unconstitutional discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Such a finding is justified
because the racially disparate impact that exists in the Supreme
Court's programmatic standing decisions between actions filed by
white plaintiffs and actions filed by minority plaintiffs supports an in-
ference of discriminatory intent. Moreover, when this evidence is sup-
plemented by the evidence of discriminatory intent that is provided by
the contemporary Court's civil rights decisions and the tradition of
racial oppression that the Court has historically fostered, the infer-
ence of unconstitutional discriminatory intent becomes too powerful
to resist.
1. Contemporary Civil Rights Decisions
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of rul-
ings in civil rights cases that have been gratuitously adverse to the in-
terests of racial minorities. The decisions can be characterized as
gratuitous either because they were noticeably insupportable under
the accepted legal rules existing at the time, or because their political
motivation was so obvious that it is difficult to view the decisions as
distinct from ordinary politics.
Included among these decisions are the five affirmative action
cases that the Court has been able to resolve with majority opinions,
the cases in which the Court sought to nullify the Title VII disparate
impact standard by reallocating burden of proof requirements under
the statute, and the cases concerning constitutional protection of ra-
cially abusive hate speech. In addition, the Court issued a number of
more esoteric decisions that helped to comprise the now infamous
1988 Term assault on minorities. The racial attitudes of the contem-
porary Supreme Court that emanate from these decisions, combined
with the racially disparate impact of the Court's standing decisions,
provides strong evidence of intentional discrimination-evidence suf-
ficient to establish an equal protection violation, if the Equal Protec-
tion Clause could meaningfully be applied to the Supreme Court.
a. Affirmative Action
Since 1974, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a
number of constitutional affirmative action cases,266 but has been able
265 See supra note 161 (inference of intent can be based upon disparate impact).
266 See supra part M-a-2 (discussing Supreme Court affirmative action decisions).
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to issue majority opinions resolving the merits in only its five most
recent decisions. In 1989 the Court decided City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co.,267 in which it applied strict scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to invalidate a minority set-aside program adopted by
the City Council of Richmond, Virginia for the award of municipal
construction contracts. 268 In 1990 the Court decided Metro Broadcast-
ing Inc. v. FCC,269 in which it applied intermediate scrutiny and up-
held two minority preference programs used by the FCC in awarding
radio and television broadcast licenses.270 In 1993 the Court decided
Shaw v. Reno,271 in which it applied strict scrutiny to a voter reappor-
tionment plan adopted by the State of North Carolina to increase mi-
nority voting strength to comply with the Voting Rights Act.2 72 In
1995 the Court decided Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,273 which
overruled Metro Broadcasting, and applied strict scrutiny to a federal
statute containing a presumption that minority construction contrac-
tors were socially and economically disadvantaged, and therefore enti-
tled to a preference in the award of construction contracts. In 1995
the Court also decided Miller v. Johnson,274 in which it extended Shaw
v. Reno by invalidating a voter reapportionment plan because the loca-
tion of the district lines had been "predominantly" motivated by race.
The Adarand decision has established that all affirmative action-
whether federal, state, or local-is now subject to strict scrutiny.275
However, Adarand also stated that strict scrutiny is no longer to be
considered fatal scrutiny.2 76 Although the Supreme Court recognizes
the potential legitimacy of using race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams for limited purposes, such as providing a remedy for the linger-
ing effects of past discrimination,277 the fact that such remedies are
harmful to whites makes affirmative action a remedy of last resort,
permissible only in limited circumstances. 278
Despite their different outcomes, these five affirmative action
cases all provide evidence of the Supreme Court's preference for the
267 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
268 See id. at 477-86.
269 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled byAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995).
270 See id. at 563-66.
271 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
272 See id. at 2824-30.
273 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
274 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
275 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (extending strict scrutiny from state and local to
federal affirmative action plans).
276 See id. ("[w]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal
in fact.' ").
277 See Adaran, 115 S. Ct. at 2117; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-506.
278 See SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 1, at 124-30 (discussing history of
Supreme Court law of affirmative action).
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interests of whites over the interests of racial minorities. The reason is
that these five cases share a common analytical peculiarity: each pro-
ceeds from the premise that the Equal Protection Clause protects
whites as well as racial minorities. This premise is stated explicitly in
the majority opinions written by Justice O'Connor in Adarand,279
Shaw,280 and Croson,281 and is tacitly reaffirmed in the Miller majority
opinion written by Justice Kennedy,282 and the Metro Broadcasting ma-
jority opinion written by Justice Brennan.283 The premise is, however,
insupportable as either an originalist or a functional matter.
As an originalist matter, the intent of the drafters of the Four-
teenth Amendment had nothing whatsoever to do with protecting the
interests of the white majority. Stated most flatteringly, the intent of
the drafters was to provide federal protection-primarily congres-
sional, as opposed to judicial, protection-to former black slaves who
were being victimized by the Black Codes of the post-Civil War South.
Stated less flatteringly, the intent of the victorious northern drafters
was to punish the rebellious southern states after the Civil War by de-
priving them of the federalism-based power to control their internal
affairs. 28 4 The intent of the drafters may have been to punish whites,
but it was certainly not to protect them.
As a functional matter, the Fourteenth Amendment is perhaps
most commonly understood as implementing a representation-rein-
forcement theory of constitutional law, under which the courts are
empowered to reverse the policy preferences of politically accounta-
ble legislatures only if there is evidence that the legislature discounted
or disregarded the interests of discrete and insular minorities who are
underrepresented in the political process.285 Although many other
theories of constitutional law exist, representation-reinforcement is
probably the most popular contemporary process theory, as evidenced
279 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108.
280 See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993).
281 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-98.
282 See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) (prohibiting assignment of
whites to voting districts on the basis of race).
283 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990), overnded by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). The Metro Broadcasting Court
applied intermediate scrutiny to FCC minority preference programs. If it had viewed
whites as unprotected by the Equal Protection Clause, it would presumably have applied
the rational basis standard of review that is typically applied in equal protection cases that
do not involve suspect classifications such as race. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590-94 (1979); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-06
(1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961).
284 See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 481-83 (discussing political environment from
which Reconstruction Amendments emerged).
285 See generally ELY, supra note 1 (describing representation-reinforcement theory).
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by Justice O'Connor's focus on the theory in her Croson opinion.28 6
Although contemporary racial minorities arguably constitute discrete
and insular minorities who are underrepresented in the political pro-
cess, it is difficult to view the white majority as a politically under-
represented minority needing judicial protection from majoritarian
legislative enactments such as the affirmative action programs at issue
in Croson, Metro Broadcasting, Shaw, Adarand, and Miller.28 7
The lack of an analytically sound basis for the contemporary
Supreme Court's assertion of the principle that the Equal Protection
Clause protects the white majority renders the Court's motives sus-
pect. Because there is no obvious reason why the Court should invali-
date majoritarian enactments to protect the white majority, the
Court's indulgence in such invalidations seems racially protectionist.
Even when the majority elects to allocate a resource to a racial minor-
ity, the Court reserves the right to invalidate that allocation if it disap-
proves of the majority's judgment. The Court appears to view itself as
the guardian of majority interests, whose job it is to prevent the tyr-
anny of the minority and to ensure that the majority is not disadvan-
taged by its own shortsightedness.288
It is possible to construct theories ofjudicial review, such as pub-
lic choice theory,289 under which the task of protecting majoritarian
286 See City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1989) (citing ELY,
supra note 1, at 170).
287 In Croson, Justice O'Connor emphasized that five of the nine seats on the Rich-
mond City Council were occupied by blacks. See id. This does not, however, establish
whites as an underrepresented minority in Richmond. Whites in Richmond appear to
have constituted roughly 50% of the population, see id., and they plainly constituted a
majority of the electorate in the State of Virginia and the United States, both of which are
political entities possessing the legal authority to nullify the Richmond set-aside program.
The FCC preferences at issue in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
were held to be congressionally authorized affirmative action plans, see id. at 563-66, and
whites obviously constitute substantial majorities in both the United States Congress and
on the FCC, which designed and implemented the preference programs. The reappor-
tionment plan at issue in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), was adopted by a state
whose legislature was so overwhelmingly white that the case centered around the first black
representative that the state had sent to Congress since Reconstruction. See id. at 2843
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Like the FCC programs in Metro Broadcasting, the presumption
of minority disadvaitage in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), was
adopted by the overwhelmingly white United States Congress. See id. at 2102-04. And like
the North Carolina reapportionment plan in Shaw, the Georgia reapportionment plan in
Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), was adopted by a majority white legislature in a
southern state with a history of voting discrimination. See id. at 2483-84.
288 For a fuller elaboration of this thesis, see SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra
note 1, at 119-49.
289 Stated briefly, public choice theory is a political economics theory positing that,
because of "free rider" problems, governmental decisionmaking will tend to favor special
interest groups rather than the more diffuse majority interest. Under this construct, an
affirmative action program that benefitted racial minority special interests would stand a
better chance of enactment than a majoritarian effort to prevent the enactment of the
special interest program. Accordingly, the job of a reviewing court would be to set aside
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preferences is a defensible function of the Supreme Court. Such the-
ories, however, do not lend themselves to characterization of the
Supreme Court as a guardian of minority interests. Rather, they rec-
ognize the Court to be the guardian of majority interests at the ex-
pense of minority interests. Accordingly, such theories suggest that
the Supreme Court will on occasion be engaged in intentional dis-
crimination within the meaning of Washington v. Davis.
b. Title VI Burden of Proof
As has been noted, the Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. that the existence of unlawful discrimination for Titie VII
purposes was to be determined through a discriminatory effects test
rather than a discriminatory intent test 2 90 In issuing the Griggs deci-
sion, the Court purported not to be relying on its own policy prefer-
ences, but to be implementing congressional intent 2 91 In subsequent
decisions, however, the Court reinterpreted the Griggs discriminatory
effects test to be very demanding-so demanding, in fact, that it be-
came arguably more difficult to satisfy than the nominally more de-
manding intentional discrimination standard of Washington v. Davis.
When the Griggs disparate impact decision was issued in 1971, it
was intended to apply most directly to objective employment criteria
such as high school diploma requirements and standardized test
scores.2 92 Although Griggs did not preclude the use of objective hiring
and promotion criteria when those criteria merely produced a racially
disparate result, the decision shifted to the employer the burden of
proving that the criteria were sufficientlyjob-related that they neutral-
ized or outweighed the racially disparate impact that resulted from
their use.2 93
In 1988 the Court confronted the issue of whether the discrimi-
natory effects test should also be applied to subjective employment
criteria, such as impressions created by personal interviews, or
whether a discriminatory intent standard was more appropriate for
subjective criteria. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,2 94 the Court
held that a discriminatory effects test should be applied despite the
the special interest enactment because it distorted the outcome that would have been pro-
duced by a properly functioning majoritarian political process. In a sense, public choice
theory is the politically conservative flip side of the typically liberal representation-rein-
forcement theory ofjudicial review. For a general discussion of public choice theory, see
ESKRIDGE & FucaKEY, supra note 1, at 867-98.
290 See supra part IlA (discussing disparate impact test for discrimination).
291 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971); cf Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (declining to adopt discriminatory effects test for equal protec-
tion purposes because adoption of such a test was a legislative function).
292 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-33.
293 See id. at 431-36.
294 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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subjective nature of the criteria because use of a discriminatory intent
standard wouldpermit employers to evade Griggs simply by combining
subjective criteria with whatever objective criteria they wished to util-
ize.2 95 However, Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion that con-
tained dicta reallocating the burden of proof. A majority of the Court
adopted this dicta the following Term in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.296
Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Wards Cove, which
first reaffirmed the applicability of a discriminatory effects test to sub-
jective employment criteria,297 and then went on to adopt Justice
O'Connor's reallocation of the burden of proof. 298 Prior to Watson
and Wards Cove, the employee's demonstration of a racially disparate
impact would establish a prima facie case of discrimination and shift
to the employer.the burden of explaining why the practice producing
the disparate impact was nevertheless a justifiable employment prac-
tice.2 99 Under the new allocation, however, an employee claiming to
be the victim of racial discrimination was given the burden not only of
proving that the challenged employment practice produced a racially
disparate impact, but of anticipating and negating explanations of the
disparate impact that might dispel the suspicion of discriminatory in-
tent.3 00 Justice White not only shifted the burden of proof, but also
made the burden unmanageable for many plaintiffs by requiring
them to focus on particular employment practices rather than on the
collective effect of all the employer's practices. 301
Under Watson and Wards Cove, an employee could no longer es-
tablish a prima facie case by demonstrating that an employer had used
a combination of seven objective and subjective selection criteria to
produce a racially disparate impact. Rather, the employee was re-
quired to isolate each of the seven criteria, prove which ones were
responsible for the disparate impact, and negate any Potential justifi-
cations for the use of those criteria in order to establish a prima facie
case. Because this is difficult to do in the large number of cases in
which no one knows precisely what is responsible for a demonstrated
disparate impact, a Title VII plaintiff could lose the very same case
that he or she would have won before Watson and Wards Cove.
295 See id. at 989-91.
296 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
297 See id. at 649-50.
298 See id. at 650-55.
299 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 404 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is busi-
ness necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.").
300 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55.
301 See id. at 655-58.
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In effect, Watson and Wards Cove required a Title VII plaintiff to
prove not only that the challenged employment practice had a dis-
criminatory effect, but also that the employer had a discriminatory in-
tent in adopting it, by negating all possible explanations for the
disparate impact that did not entail discriminatory intent. Stated
more succinctly, Watson and Wards Cove replaced the Griggs discrimi-
natory effects test with a discriminatory effects plus discriminatory in-
tent test. Although the operative legal standard for Title VII cases
changed as a result of Watson and Wards Cove, the statutory language
of Title VII did not. The only thing that changed was the political
orientation of the Supreme Court.
In 1971, when Griggs was decided, the Court was in a very real
sense still the Warren Court. Chief Justice Warren had retired only
two years earlier.30 2 By 1989, however, when Wards Cove was decided,
Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart had been replaced by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy.30 3 The 1989 Court was much more conservative on racial issues
than the immediate post-Warren Court had been. A measure of the
1989 Court's racial conservatism is provided by the fact that none of
the four replacement Justices has ever voted in favor of the minority
position in an affirmative action case that the Court has decided on
constitutional grounds.30 4 Now that Justices Brennan and Marshall
302 See STONE Er AL., supra note 1, at lxxxi-lxxxiii (chart showing tenure of Supreme
Court justices).
303 See id.
304 See supra note 204 (citing the 14 constitutional affirmative action cases that the
Court has considered to date). In each of those cases ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy either voted against the racial minority position or were
not on the Court when the case was decided. The only arguable exception is the vote cast
by then-Justice Rehnquist in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), to
uphold a New York legislative apportionment scheme. The scheme had been adopted in
order to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and it increased black voting strength by dilut-
ing the voting strength of a HasidicJewish community. See id. at 147-55 (White, J.) (stating
facts); id. at 165-68 (Stewart, J., joined by Stevens & Rehnquist, JI.). It is not clear what
inference should be drawn fromJustice Rehnquist's vote in this case. Even thoughJustice
Rehnquist voted against the Hasidic plaintiffs, he may well have conceived of the case as
involving a dispute between two minority groups rather than as a dispute between a racial
minority and the majority.
It should also be noted thatJustice O'Connor voted to dismiss Northeastern Florida as
moot. See Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJackson-
ville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2805-09 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in the factually similar City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989), leaves little doubt that she would vote to invalidate the Northeastern
Florida affirmative action plan on the merits if she viewed the issue as properly presented.
Although all four replacementJustices voted to dismiss for lack of standing the voter reap-
portionment challenge in United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995), all four voted on
the same day to uphold the merits of the same type of reapportionment challenge in Miller
v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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have been replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas,30 5 the present
Supreme Court is even more conservative on racial issues.3 06
Congress overruled the Watson and Wards Cove decisions in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and restored the Griggs disparate impact bur-
den and standard of proof to Title VII.30 7 This suggests not only that
the Supreme Court was politically motivated in its reinterpretation of
Tide VII, but that its reinterpretation of the statute was outside the
mainstream of contemporary thought on the issue of racial discrimi-
nation in employment. In addition, the Court's pretense in Watson
and Wards Cove that it was preserving the Griggs disparate impact stan-
dard for subjective criteria cases-when it was in fact imposing a new
standard that would often be harder to satisfy than the Washington v.
Davis intent standard-evinces disrespect for racial minorities by sug-
gesting that minorities are unworthy of candid disclosures. The
Court's conservative deviation from the norm on the burden of proof
issue in Title VII cases, combined with its condescension, provide ad-
ditional reasons to suspect that the Court has engaged in intentional
discrimination in issuing its racially correlated pattern of standing
decisions.
c. Hate Speech
The regulation of hate speech-speech consisting of racially de-
rogatory language, epithets, or symbols-is one of the most controver-
sial topics in contemporary constitutional law. Racial minorities often
argue that hate speech is a unique form of tortious injury that silences
minority speech, inflicts severe emotional harm on its victims, pro-
vides no corresponding societal benefit, and increases inter-group
frictions in a way that frustrates ultimate realization of generally ac-
cepted goals of racial tolerance, harmony, and uninhibited free ex-
pression.308 Opponents of hate speech regulation often argue that
First Amendment values favoring free expression are seriously under-
mined by the censorship of hate speech because it has traditionally
been understood that the government should not regulate expression
305 See STONE Er AL., supra note 1, at lxx, Lxxxiii & 1994 Supp. at 1-2 (chart showing
tenure of Supreme Court justices and biographical data concerning Justices Souter and
Thomas).
306 It is too soon to tell how the replacement ofJustices White and Blackmun byJus-
tices Ginsburg and Breyer will affect the political leaning of the Court in race cases. Both
Justices, however, dissented from the majority opinions in Miller and Adarand. See Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2497 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2134 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
307 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1993)).
308 See, e.g., MAre J. MATSUDA ET AL., WoRDs THAT WOUND: CRrrIcAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (offering arguments to justify regu-
lation of hate speech).
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on the grounds that it disapproves of the content of that
expression.3 09
In recent Terms, the Supreme Court has twice considered the
constitutionality of hate speech regulations. In 1992 the Court de-
cided RA. V. v. City of St. Paul310 invalidating a "Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance" that prohibited the display of symbols such as burning
crosses or swastikas that were likely to "arouse [ ] anger, alarm or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der."311.Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, accepted for the sake of
argument the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the ordi-
nance as encompassing only those forms of expression that are "fight-
ing words" unprotected by the First Amendment.3 12 Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia concluded that the St. Paul ordinance violated the First
Amendment because it constituted a content-based regulation which
punished speech that offended on the basis of race and the other cat-
egories enumerated in the ordinance, but did not punish speech that
offended on the basis of other characteristics. 313 He noted that derog-
atory speech about one's mother or derogatory speech directed at
"anti-Catholic bigots" might be very offensive but would not be pro-
scribed by the ordinance, thereby demonstrating that the ordinance
encompassed impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 314
In 1993 the Court issued a decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell 315 up-
holding the constitutionality of a Wisconsin hate crimes penalty en-
hancement statute, which had been used to increase the maximum
sentence given to a criminal defendant convicted of aggravated bat-
tery because the defendant intentionally selected his victim on the ba-
sis of race.316 ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion rejected the
argument that the penalty enhancement statute violated the First
Amendment by penalizing the defendant's abstract racial beliefs, and
held that the enhancement statute punished conduct rather than
speech.317 Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished RA.V. as a case in
which the underlying crime consisted of expression, whereas in Mitch-
ell, the underlying crime had nothing to do with expression. Expres-
309 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 1, at 65 (1993) (arguing that minority interests are ulti-
mately better protected through guarantee of free speech than through suppression of
hate speech); Charles Fried, The New First AmendmentJurispunae: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.
CHI. L. REv. 225, 245-55 (1992) (arguing that regulation of hate speech is inconsistent with
traditional First Amendment liberty).
310 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
311 See id. at 2541.
312 See id. at 2542 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
313 See id. at 2542-50.
314 See id. at 2548.
315 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
316 See id. at 2197.
317 See id. at 2199-2202.
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sion-in the form of the defendant's motivating beliefs-was relevant
only to determine the defendant's sentence, not his culpability.318
The Mitchell opinion relied in passing on Dawson v. Delawar 19 and
Barclay v. Fhnoida320 to support the distinction between speech and
conduct. Dawson held that the defendant's abstract status as a racial
bigot could not be used to justify imposition of the death penalty, but
Barclay held that racial bigotry relevant to the defendant's crime could
be used to justify imposition of the death penalty.3 21
Despite the assurances of ChiefJustice Rehnquist, it is difficult to
distinguish Mitchell from R.A.V The distinction offered in Mitchell
rests upon the belief that a meaningful difference between speech
and conduct exists. However, because speech is conduct and because
much conduct is expressive, it is not surprising that the distinction
between the two has proved to be elusive.
Under the Mitchell fact situation, there are two relevant crimes:
battery, which carries a normal penalty, and bigoted battery, which
carries the normal penalty for battery plus an enhanced penalty for
bigotry. When the two crimes are compared, the battery components
and their associated penalties cancel each other out, and all that is left
is bigotry and the enhanced penalty. There is no conduct left, only
speech-bigotry-and R.A.V holds that bigotry alone cannot be crimi-
nally punished because that would implicate the government in the
impermissible content-based regulation of speech that it disfavors.
The Dawson and Barclay decisions-on which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist relied to support his proffered distinction between speech and
conduct-do nothing to avoid the problem. Everyone agrees that a
defendant's "good" characteristics can be considered in the abstract as
mitigating factors by a sentencing judge or jury.322 This establishes
that "speech," as well as conduct, is relevant to the state's imposition
of criminal punishment. Although one might try to distinguish Daw-
son and Barclay by focusing on the degree of relevance that a defen-
dant's abstract beliefs have to the defendant's crime3 23 or on whether
the defendant's beliefs are used to mitigate or enhance the defen-
dant's sentence, 324 these are simply matters of judicial discretion and
318 See id.
319 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
320 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
321 See Mitchel4 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
322 See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 169-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing instances in
which mitigating character traits have been held to be admissible and listing the mitigating
character traits that were admitted in the Dawson case itself).
323 Cf id. at 178-80 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (noting that Due Process Clause-not First
Amendment-regulates degree to which evidence can be admitted in light of its probative
value and prejudicial nature).
324 Intuitively, it may seem different to admit evidence that the defendant was a Girl
Scout or an altar boy for the purpose of mitigating the defendant's sentence, than to admit
1482 [Vol. 80:1422
COLOR-CODED STANDING
have nothing whatsoever to do with a qualitative distinction between
conduct and speech.
Justice Scalia might respond that because bigotry was assumed to
be unprotected speech in RA.V, it can be suppressed by the govern-
ment as long as the government chooses to suppress all bigotry and
does not selectively engage in viewpoint discrimination with respect to
the various brands of bigotry that compete for recognition in the mar-
ketplace of ideas.3 25 But the Wisconsin statute that was upheld in
Mitchell enumerates roughly the same categories of proscribed bigotry
as did the St. Paul ordinance that was invalidated in R.A.V Race,
color, and religion are common to both; the Wisconsin statute adds
disability, sexual orientation, and national origin or ancestry; and the
St. Paul ordinance adds creed and gender.3 26 Both omit from their
coverage bigotry directed at a person's mother and bigotry directed
against "anti-Catholic bigots"-the two categories of bigotry on which
Justice Scalia focused to illustrate the deficiency in the St. Paul
ordinance.3 27
Some have suggested that despite the difficulty of finding neutral
or principled differences between the "speech" protected in RA. V
and the "conduct" punished in Mitchell, there is certainly a difference
between pure expression on the one hand and expression that is inti-
mately connected to conduct on the other.328 Along the spectrum of
speech-connected-to-conduct, for example, an arbitrary discharge
from employment is qualitatively distinct from a racially motivated dis-
charge. Accordingly, the legislature should be free to punish the two
forms of speech-connected-to-conduct differently, as Congress chose
to do in Title VII.3 2 9 Similarly, no one argues that the distinction
drawn between child molestation and adult molestation for sentenc-
ing purposes is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. These
distinctions, however, are every bit as infirm as the purported distinc-
evidence that the defendant belonged to a racist organization for the purpose of enhanc-
ing the defendant's sentence. However, it is difficult to find a principled difference be-
tween these two--especially a difference that does anything to support a distinction
between speech and conduct.
325 Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist does not make this argument in Mitchell but
rather rests on the speech-conduct distinction. See Mitchel, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01. This is
particularly surprising because Chief Justice Rehnquist devotes much of his energy in a
previous portion of the opinion to undermining the speech-conduct distinction by citing the
numerous instances in which we focus on the defendant's motives and beliefs-the defen-
dan's speech-in order to determine how much to punish the defendant's conduct. See
id. at 2199-200.
326 Compare Mitchell 113 S. Ct. at 2197 with R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (setting out perti-
nent legal provisions).
327 See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
328 See Cole, supra note 1, at 65-68.
329 See id. at 66 (emphasizing noncommunicative aspect of conduct state wishes to
punish).
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tion between RA.V. and Mitchell. The fact that we routinely tolerate
differential punishment of discharges and molestations, despite the
expressive components of their motivations, only means that the
Supreme Court honors the tenuous distinction between speech and
conduct when it is convenient to do so. It does not mean that the
distinction has content.
RA.V. and Mitchell are indistinguishable along the spectrum of
First Amendment doctrine, but they are distinguishable along another
spectrum. The defendant who escaped a criminal sentence in R.A.V
was white,330 but the defendant who was subjected to an enhanced
criminal sentence in Mitchell was black.331 The victim whose racially
motivated injury was found to be redressable under the Constitution
in Mitchell was white,332 but the victim whose racially motivated injury
was found not to be redressable under the Constitution in R.A.V. was
black.3 33 In the two cases on which Chief Justice Rehnquist relied in
Mitchell to illustrate when bigotry could be considered by a sentencing
judge or jury in death penalty cases, the outcome also varied with the
race of the defendant. In Dawson v. Delaware, the bigot whose bigotry
was held to be inadmissible was a white supremacist.33 4 In Barclay v.
F/orida, the bigot wlhose bigotry was held to be admissible was a mem-
ber of the Black Liberation Army.3 3 5
When doctrine gets murky, it loses its ability to justify outcomes.
One is then forced to look for alternate ways to account for those
outcomes. In racially charged cases such as R.A.V., Mitchell, Dawson,
and Barclay, racial correlations between those whom the Supreme
Court elects to protect and those whom the Court elects to abandon
become conspicuous. Realistically, Supreme Court adjudications are
at least as interesting for the messages that they send as for the doctri-
nal rules that they articulate. The hate speech cases provide yet an-
other basis for suspecting that the Court was engaged in intentional
discrimination when it issued its racially correlated pattern of standing
decisions.
d. The 1988 Term
The Supreme Court's 1988 Term symbolizes the racial attitude of
the present Supreme Court. During that Term, the Rehnquist Court
issued a series of rulings that were either directly or indirectly harmful
330 See Brief for Respondent at 1-2, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)
(No. 90-7675) (stating that defendant was white).
331 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2196 (1993) (stating that defendant was
black).
332 See id. (stating that victim was white).
333 See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (stating that victim was black).
334 See Mitchel4 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (discussing Dawson).
335 See id. (discussing Barclay).
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to the political and economic interests of racial minorities. In case
after case, the Court was unrelenting in its dissemination of the
message that the Supreme Court was no longer the place to which
minorities should turn for improvement of their social condition.
Many of these decisions were subsequently overruled by Congress
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.336 Although congressional reversal
helped to nullify the substantive damage that the Court had inflicted,
itdid nothing to reverse the impression created by the Term's deci-
sions that the Court is an institution unreceptive to minority claims
for protection from the race-related dangers inherent in ordinary
politics.
As U.S. Law Week observed, "A series of civil rights decisions by a
conservative majority of the U.S. Supreme Court making it easier to
challenge affirmative action programs and more difficult to establish
claims of employment discrimination highlighted the 1988-89 term's
labor and employment cases."33 7 Law Week described seven decisions
that had been handed down that Term to illustrate its point. The two
best known decisions were City of Richmond v. fA. Croson Co.,338 which
invalidated the minority set-aside plan adopted by the Richmond City
Council,339 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,3 40 which reallocated
and heightened the burden of proof in Title VII cases.3 4'
The other decisions referenced in Law Week were less celebrated
but still harmful to minority interests in both substantive and symbolic
ways. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,a42 the Supreme Court
adopted a narrow construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981-a Reconstruction
civil rights statute that, among other things, prohibits discrimination
in the making or enforcement of contracts. The Court held that the
statute did not prohibit racial harassment of minority employees by
their employers despite the contractual basis of the employment. The
Court then held inJett v. Dallas Independent School District343 that § 1981
actions could not be used to file discrimination claims against munici-
palities under a theory of respondeat superior.
In Martin v. Wilks,344 the Court permitted white workers to main-
tain a collateral attack on a Title VII consent decree that contained
336 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1993)).
337 Review of Supreme Court's Term: Labor and Employment Law, 58 U.S.L.W. 3065 (Aug. 8,
1989).
338 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
39 See supra notes 267, 286-87 and accompanying text (discussing Croson).
340 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
341 See supra notes 296-301 and accompanying text (discussing Wards Cove).
342 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
343 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (race discrimination claim filed by white employee against
black employer).
344 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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affirmative action provisions, even though the workers had chosen not
to intervene in the litigation out of which the consent decree had
emerged. 345 In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,346 the Court held
that the statute of limitations for Title VII challenges to discriminatory
seniority systems began to run when the seniority systems were first
adopted, rather than when the discriminatory aspects of the system
emerged in the form of seniority-based demotions.3m7 In Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,348 the Court held that attorney's
fees for prevailing plaintiffs could not be assessed against unsuccessful
union intervenors in the Tide VII case.349
Two 1988 Term cases that were not included in the Law Week
account also adversely affected the interests of racial minorities. In
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,350 the Court held that discriminatory em-
ployment decisions did not violate Tide VII if the employer could
show that the plaintiff would not have received the benefit sought
even in the absence of the alleged discrimination. In Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police,351 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983-an-
other Reconstruction statute, which prohibits official discrimination
under "color" of state law-did not permit discrimination suits to be
filed against states as employers because states did not constitute "per-
sons" within the meaning of § 1983.
Congress responded to the 1988 Term by enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,352 which overruled many of that Term's decisions.
In Landgraf v. USIFilm Products,353 the Supreme Court listed the 1988
Term cases, as well as other recent decisions, that Congress modified
by its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 354 The Court noted
that the purpose of the Act was "to respond to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes
in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimina-
tion."3 55 Section 3(4) of the Act, as well as sections 2(2) and 3(2),
changed the Court's new burden of proof requirements by restoring
the burden of proof rules that had existed prior to Wards Cove.356 In
addition, section 101 changed the result in Patterson, by extending the
345 See id. at 763-68.
346 490 U.S. 900, 909-11 (1989) (gender discrimination case that also applies to race).
347 See2 id. at 909-11.
348 491 U.S. 754, 761-66 (1989).
349 See id. at 761-66.
350 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (gender discrimination case that also applies to race).
35' 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
352 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1993)).
353 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
354 See id. at 1489-90.
355 Id. at 1489 quoting § 3(4) of the Act.
356 See id.
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42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibition on discrimination in the making or en-
forcement of contracts to encompass on-the-job racial harassment of
employees, 357 Section 107 changed the result in Price Waterhouse by
prescribing new discrimination standards to be used in mixed-motive
discrimination cases. 3 58 Section 108 changed the result in Martin v.
Wilks by prohibiting certain collateral challenges to employment con-
sent decrees.3 59 Section 112 changed the result in Lorance by enlarg-
ing the rights of minority employees to challenge discriminatory
seniority systems.360
The fact that the Supreme Court, in a single Term, issued a string
of nine cases that were uniformly adverse to racial minority interests
does not alone prove anything. Nevertheless, the nine cases are sug-
gestive of a racially insensitive attitude. When the 1988 Term is con-
sidered in conjunction with the congressional reversal of many of the
cases decided that Term, the Supreme Court begins to look like an
institution that is at the periphery, rather than the core, of contempo-
rary attitudes on race. When the 1988 Term is considered in conjunc-
tion with the current Court's doctrinally tenuous hostility toward the
merits of affirmative action cases, the suggestion of racial insensitivity
grows stronger still. When all of this is then combined with the
Court's willingness to adopt a dramatic shift in the traditional burden
of proof for Titie VII cases, the suggestion becomes a strong suspicion.
The suspicion is reinforced by the Court's racially correlated decisions
in the hate speech cases. This suspicion, combined with the strikingly
disparate impact of the Court's standing decisions, is sufficient to sup-
port a compelling inference of intentional discrimination that violates
the Equal Protection Clause under the Court's own standard in Wash-
ington v. Davis. Characterization of the Supreme Court as intention-
ally discriminatory is not unique to the Rehnquist Court. As an
institutional matter, the Supreme Court has always been intentionally
discriminatory.
2. Traditional Discrimination
Whether or not the discriminatory pattern of the Supreme
Court's standing decisions is ultimately deemed to amount to inten-
357 See id.
358 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1489-90 (1994).
359 See id.
360 See id. at 1490. In addition to modifying these 1988 Term decisions, § 109 of the
Act overruled EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), by redefining the
term "employee" in Title VII to include certain United States citizens working for United
States employers in foreign countries; § 113 overruled West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), by providing that attorneys' fees recoverable under Title
VII could include expert fees; and § 114 overruled Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
310 (1986), by authorizing the recovery of interest on judgments against the United States.
See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1490.
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tional discrimination within the meaning of Washington v. Davis, it
does constitute traditional discrimination. Supreme Court decisions
such as Northeastern Florida are merely the latest offerings in a long
tradition of Supreme Court decisions that have preserved majority
control over minority interests. Whether or not Supreme Court jus-
tices consciously intend to do so, they serve as agents of the majority
in implementing majoritarian preferences concerning minority rights.
The Supreme Court is ideally suited to serve in a majoritarian
institutional role because its task is to make rhetorical pronounce-
ments that give meaning to the goals and objectives to which our soci-
ety aspires. In practice, however, the Court has not lived up to those
aspirational goals and objectives itself. Because it is the Supreme
Court that determines the meaning of the Constitution,361 there is no
institution of government that has the formal or practical ability to
enforce constitutional norms against the Court.
As a result, it is not surprising that, throughout the history of the
United States, the Supreme Court has presided over the sacrifice of
minority interests for majority gain.362 Perhaps the three most famous
race relations cases decided by the Supreme Court are Dred Scott,36 3
Plessy,364 and Brown.365 All three of these cases illustrate the manner
in which the Supreme Court has sacrificed racial minority interests for
majority gain.
a. Dred Scott
In the Court's 1857 Dred Scott decision, the Supreme Court's sacri-
fice of minority rights for majority gain was obvious. Dred Scott was a
slave who sought ajudicial declaration that he had become free when
his owner had taken him first to a free state, then to a federal territory
in which slavery had been prohibited, and finally back to the owner's
original slave state. 366 At stake was the issue of whether Dred Scott
existed for the benefit of Dred Scott himself, or for the benefit of
Dred Scott's owner. In ruling against the slave and in favor of the
361 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (recognizing "the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," and
quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), for proposition that "[i]t
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
362 For an extended argument in support of this proposition see SPANN, RACE AGAINST
THE COURT, supra note 1, at 94-99, 104-18.
363 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 398 (1856).
364 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
365 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting separate-but-
equal iriterpretation of Equal Protection Clause of United States Constitution); see also
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering desegregation of
public schools "with all deliberate speed").
366 See Dred Scot, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 396-99.
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owner, the Supreme Court sacrificed the liberty interest of a black
person in order to protect the property interest of a white person.3 67
The precise legal issue that was before the Supreme Court in Dred
Scott was whether a black person was a "citizen" entitled to invoke di-
versity jurisdiction to file suit in federal court. s68 In ruling that Dred
Scott was not a citizen, the Court based its decision on the subhuman
character of blacks. The language ofJustice Taney's famous opinion
is as colorful as it is telling:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are sy-
nonymous.... The question before us is, whether [blacks are] a
portion of this people.... We think they are not ... and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which [the Consti-
tution] provides .... On the contrary, they were at that time con-
sidered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not,
yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privi-
leges but such as those who held the power and the Government
might choose to grant them.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as be-
ings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect;
and that the negro mightjustly and lawfully be reduced to slavery
for his benefit.3 69
After holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because blacks
could not be considered citizens, Justice Taney went on to offer pro-
nouncements about the importance of protecting the property rights
of slave holders.370 These pronouncements were gratuitous because
the Court had just held that it lacked jurisdiction to issue them; but
they are noteworthy because the Supreme Court was willing to invali-
date an Act of Congress-for only the second time in its history37 1 -in
order to implement them. The Court held that the Missouri Compro-
mise,3 72 which prohibited slavery in certain portions of the Louisiana
367 See id. at 451-52.
368 See id. at 400-02.
369 Id. at 404-05, 407.
370 See id. at 451-52.
371 The first time that the Supreme Court invalidated an act of Congress was in Mar-
bury v. Madison, where it declared § 18 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to be unconstitutional.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch.) 137, 176-80 (1803).
372 Act of Mar. 6, 1820, 3 Stat. 545 (popularly known as Missouri Compromise).
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Purchase, 373 was unconstitutional because it interfered with the fights
of slave owners.3 74
Ultimately, the Court's pronouncements were reversed by the
Civil War, and Dred Scott is now generally considered to be an embar-
rassment. Justice Taney's opinion is now the emanation of a meddle-
some Supreme Court justice who wrongly thought he could do a
better job than Congress of managing a political controversy. If in-
deed Dred Scott is the icon of a bygone era, it is no longer cause for
continuing concern. But if, as the meddlesome Supreme Court ac-
tions that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 suggest,37 5 Dred Scott was
merely the first in a tradition of racially abusive Supreme Court deci-
sions, Dred Scott remains ominous.
b. Plessy
After the Civil War, ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments overruled Dred Scott and granted citizenship to former
black slaves.3 76 In its 1896 decision in Plessy, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and held that the equal protection guarantee could be
satisfied by according separate-but-equal treatment to whites and ra-
cial minorities. 377 In upholding a Louisiana statute that required ra-
cial segregation in railroad cars,378 the Court engaged in a practice
that it has carried through to its modern race cases: It chose to con-
duct constitutional analysis at the level of fictitious formalism rather
than at the level of common knowledge realism.
In P/essy, the Court was willing to adopt the fiction that Louisi-
ana's racial segregation could be equal, even though that segregation
had evolved from the same culture of slavery that the Taney Court had
sought to protect in Dred Scott. Justice Harlan emphasized in his dis-
senting opinion that the invidiousness of the railroad segregation stat-
ute was well known, and he prophetically predicted that Plessy would
come to be regarded as a decision whose perniciousness would equal
that of Dred Scott itself.379 Nevertheless, the majority chose to overlook
the common knowledge aspects of the Louisiana statute in favor of
the statute's formal declaration of equality and race neutrality.380
373 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScOTr CASE: ITs SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW ANn POLITICS 107-13 (1978) (discussing Missouri Compromise and political context
out of which it arose).
374 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451-52.
375 See supra part I1I.B.l.d (discussing 1988 Term decisions that led to Civil Rights Act
of 1991).
376 See U.S. CONST. amend. XHII, X1V.
377 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-52 (1896).
378 See id. at 540-42.
379 See id. at 556-57, 559-60 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
380 See id. at 540, 548.
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Despite the political context out of which Plessy emerged-Dred
Scott, followed by the Civil War, followed by the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment-the holding of Pessy was not surprising.
Plessy had been presaged by the Slaughter-House Cases381 and the Civil
Rights Cases.382 In a move that may reflect an enduring characteristic
of the Court as an institution, the Supreme Court responded to the
political reversal of its earlier Dred Scott decision by adopting a narrow
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment is best understood as an effort to
secure the constitutionality of congressional Reconstruction statutes
that were designed to shift primary responsibility for the protection of
.minority interests from the states to the federal government after the
Civil War.383 Prior to enactment of the Reconstruction amendments,
there was a danger that the courts would find protective federal legis-
lation to be an unconstitutional violation of the then robust doctrine
of federalism. Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was in-
tended to eliminate any potential federalism problems.38 4
Despite this history, the Supreme Court adopted a narrow con-
struction of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Slaughter-House Cases,
which concerned a business monopoly and did not directly involve
race, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not shift
general responsibility for the protection of civil rights from the states
to the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment merely ex-
panded federal regulatory authority in matters that were closely re-
lated to the protection of newly freed slaves.38 5
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court invalidated the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the
grounds that the statute was limited to state action and could not
reach private discrimination. 38 6 By imposing a state action require-
ment, the Court nullified the primary purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because state action could be established only after a
showing that state legal protections were unavailable for claims of ra-
cial discrimination, the Supreme Court effectively shifted primary re-
381 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
382 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
383 See STONE ET Al., supra note 1, at 481-88 (discussing history and purpose of Recon-
struction statutes and constitutional amendments).
384 See id.
385 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-83 (1872). Note the ten-
sion between this narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and its current,
more expansive interpretation as protecting the individual interests of the white majority.
See supra part III.B.l.a (discussing applications of Equal Protection Clause to white majority
in Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990); and City of Richmond v.J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
386 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-19 (1883).
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sponsibility for the protection of minority interests back to the states,
thereby undoing the fundamental purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 87
Although Plessy has come to stand for the proposition that sepa-
rate treatment of the races must also be equal treatment, the language
of Plessy nowhere imposes an equality requirement388 In a sense, this
is a mere technical deficiency because the statute that the Court was
reviewing in Plessy explicitly required equal treatment in addition to
separate treatment.38 9 In another sense, however, the Court's omis-
sion of an equality requirement in Plessy was prescient, because the
Court would subsequently choose to tolerate segregation require-
ments without insisting on equality.390
Sometimes the Court did invalidate state segregation statutes be-
cause of their failure to provide for equal treatment. In McCabe v.
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Co.,391 for example, the Court in-
validated a railroad segregation statute that accorded lower quality ac-
commodations to minorities than to whites because of minimal
minority demand.3 92 On other occasions, however, the Court refused
to recognize inequality of segregated facilities as a basis for invalidat-
ing segregation laws under the Equal Protection Clause. In Cumming
v. County Board of Education,3 93 the Court rejected an equal protection
challenge by minority taxpayers to a tax assessment that was used to
support a segregated white high school after the school district had
closed the only black high school in the area. As a result, both blacks
and whites were required to pay to support the white high school, but
only whites were permitted to attend it.3 9 4
Interestingly, the Cumming opinion was written by Justice Harlan,
the mild dissenter in Pessy.395 Although the post-Pessy cases were in-
consistent with respect to whether constitutionally permissible sepa-
rate treatment also had to be equal treatment, Brown ultimately
resolved this inconsistency ... establishing unequivocally that equality
would not be required.
387 See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 485-88 (discussing fundamental change in Four-
teenth Amendment caused by the Civil Rights Cases).
388 See id. at 490-92 (discussing absence of "equality" requirement in Pessy).
389 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (quoting statutory requirement for "equal but separate
accommodations").
390 See generally STONE Ex AL., supra note 1, at 490-92 (discussing cases implementing
Plessy without insisting on equality of treatment).
391 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
392 See id. at 160-62.
393 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
394 See id. at 541-45.
395 See id. at 541 (majority opinion by Harlan, J.); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
1492 [Vol. 80:1422
COLOR-CODED STANDING
c. Brown
Brown v. Board of Education is commonly offered as the case that
proves the institutional ability of the Supreme Court to resist
majoritarian pressures and to protect minority rights.396 Brown over-
ruled the separate-but-equal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
that was adopted in PlessyP97 and required the desegregation of public
schools "with all deliberate speed. g398 Accordingly, Brown is generally
interpreted as having negated the obvious racial prejudice of the Ta-
ney Court in Dred Scott, and as having corrected the misguided con-
ception of equality to which the Court succumbed in Plessy. However,
Brown did none of these things. It did not desegregate the public
schools, and it certainly did not overrule Plessy.
Brown was decided over forty years ago, yet many public schools
are still segregated. One-third of black public school students in the
United States still attend all-black schools, and sixty-three percent at-
tend schools that are at least half black.3 99 The reason that the public
schools have not been desegregated is that the Supreme Court lost its
resolve as popular support for desegregation dissipated.
Professor Bell has argued that when Brown was decided, it was not
the countermajoritarian decision that it is publicly heralded to have
been.40 0 Rather, he argues, the Brown decision reflected a national
coalition of majoritarian interests that converged on the desirability of
imposing school desegregation on the South. The interests of blacks
who desired integrated education, whites who saw southern segrega-
396 See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1133
(1991) ("Living in the shadow of Brown," we have come to view state officials as a threat to
individual and minority rights, and federal courts as "the special guardians" of those
rights.); James 0. Freedman, The Law as Educator, 70 IowA L. REv. 487, 494 (1985) ("law
reinforced and validated the movement toward greater civil rights for minority citizens by
expressing the values of equality in the landmark legislation and court decisions of the
1950's and 1960's, particularly Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Act of
1964"); Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 981 (1957) ("In Brown v. Board of Education, the
Court, speaking the conscience of a majority of the nation, took a giant step in the evolu-
tion of full equality for the Negroes."); Harold A. McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and
Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 83, 113
n.202 (1989) ("According to Professor Sherry, the Warren Court was the mirror opposite
of the Burger Court, intervening as in Brown I to prevent minority rights from being
subordinated to the will of the majority") (citing Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the
Burger Court: Saving the Community from ltself, 70 MiNN. L. Ray. 611, 652 (1986)); Sharon K.
Mollman, The Gender Gap: Separating the Sexes in Public Education, 68 IND. LJ. 149, 156 n.51
(1992) ("Forced exclusion was a motivating factor in Brown v. Board of Education [citation
omitted] where the Court, reacting to a history of segregation forced upon the black mi-
nority by the white majority, denounced 'separate but equal' education.").
397 See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
398 See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
399 See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 530.
400 See Bell, supra note 1, at 91-106; see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988).
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don as a threat to national economic growth, and foreign policy advo-
cates who viewed southern segregation as a liability in the competition
with communism for control over the third world, all converged to
favor the desegregation of southern schools.
The South, of course, objected to desegregation, but-reminis-
cent of Reconstruction-the national majority cared little about paro-
chial southern interests. Once the desegregation effort began to
move north, however, the national coalition supporting school deseg-
regation crumbled, and the Supreme Court halted the desegregation
process.40' Because de facto northern school segregation tended to
be a product of residential segregation rather than dejure state laws,
the Court was able to curtail unpopular northern desegregation by
declining to remedy de facto segregation,40 2 by refusing to order in-
terdistrict desegregation remedies,40 3 and by tolerating unequal fund-
ing between inner-city and suburban schools. 40 4  Far from
demonstrating that the Supreme Court can withstand majoritarian
pressures and protect minority rights, Brown's failure to desegregate
northern schools indicates the coextensiveness of Supreme Court pro-
tection and majority support.40 5
Brown is commonly cited as the case that overruled Pessy, but that
characterization is also inaccurate. Although Brown did preclude for-
mal separate-but-equal government conduct, it also reaffirmed Plessy
in two important respects. First, Brown reaffirmed Pessy's application
of constitutional analysis at the level of fictitious formalism rather
than at the level of common knowledge realism. Because Brown re-
quired the replacement of dual school systems with unitary systems,'40 6
it is now formally correct that most public schools in the United States
have finally been desegregated. The common knowledge reality that
many urban schools are still severely segregated is simply irrelevant as
a formal matter, just as the invidious nature of the Louisiana railroad
segregation law was formally irrelevant in Plessy.407
Second, Brown reaffirmed Plessy's omission of an equality require-
ment. Professor Seidman has argued that the Brown decision was nec-
essary to save the nation from the implications of a separate-but-equal
doctrine that had a real equality component.408 If public schools, for
example, were to be accorded equal funding regardless of the race of
401 See SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 1, at 78-80, 108-09 (charting
Supreme Court's reluctance to extend desegregation effort to northern schools).
402 Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
403 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
404 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
405 See Bell, supra note 1, at 98-102.
406 See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
407 See supra part III.B.2.b (discussing Pessy).
408 See Seidman, supra note 1, at 686-717.
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the students who attended them, the majority would be confronted
with a threat to its "liberal individualism" that would be politically un-
acceptable.40 9 In contemporary American culture, the concept of
equal educational funding for white and minority students is un-
fathomable, and Supreme Court imposition of such a requirement is
unimaginable. Brown, however, relieved the Supreme Court of any
obligation to require actual equality. By defining equality for equal
protection purposes to consist of formal integration, Brown enabled
the Supreme Court to avoid the abandonment of majoritarian con-
cerns simply to aid racial minorities.
Both Dred Scott and P/esy offer strong support for the proposition
that the Supreme Court is willing to sacrifice the interests of racial
minorities in order to benefit the majority. Although it is easy to con-
sign those two cases to the dark side of American history and to argue
that they are not relevant to the contemporary racial attitudes of the
Supreme Court, a proper understanding of Brown indicates that this is
simply untrue. The present Court is just as committed to the protec-
tion of majority interests at the expense of minority interests as were
the Dred Scott and Plessy Courts. The details may have changed as the
social acceptability of overt discrimination has changed, but within
the range of whatever discrimination is culturally tolerable at any
given point in time, the Supreme Court can be counted on to perform
ritualistic sacrifices of minority interests as those sacrifices become
necessary for the well being of the majority.
The racially disparate impact of the current Court's standing de-
cisions merely serves as a recent example of the Court's majoritarian
role. Combined with the other evidence concerning Supreme Court
racial predispositions that is available, cases like Northeastern Florida
demonstrate that the Supreme Court not only engages in intentional
discrimination that is theoretically unconstitutional, but that the
Court's intentional discrimination is as traditional as it is
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The present Supreme Court is very stingy on the issue of stand-
ing. If a plaintiff wishes to use federal litigation to force program-
matic changes on government, the court-led by Justice Scalia-is
likely to view that litigation as an illegitimate request for judicial inter-
vention into the political process, and is likely to deny the plaintiff
standing on redressability-related grounds. That is not an insupporta-
ble view of the Supreme Court's governmental role. The problem is
409 See id. at 709-15.
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that the Court is stingier on standing for racial minorities than for the
white majority.
When minority plaintiffs file programmatic challenges to govern-
ment actions alleged to be racially discriminatory, they typically take
the form of a challenge to a pattern and practice of official discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court regularly dismisses such actions because of
their programmatic nature. However, when white plaintiffs file
programmatic challenges to government actions alleged to be racially
discriminatory, they typically take the form of a challenge to the legal-
ity of an affirmative action program that benefits minorities at the ex-
pense of the majority. And the Court almost always permits such
actions to be maintained.
This discriminatory approach to standing was most pronounced
in Northeastern Florida, in which the Supreme Court strained to allow a
white plaintiff affirmative action challenge despite serious standing
defects. Although the Court explicitly addressed the minority plaintiff
discrimination cases that it had dismissed for lack of standing in the
past, it nevertheless chose to grant standing to the white plaintiff in
Northeastern Florida. In so doing, the Court not only recognized, but
ratified and perpetuated the racially disparate impact of its standing
decisions.
The racially disparate impact of the Court's standing decisions is
so striking that it would almost certainly violate Tide VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 if that statute applied to Supreme Court decision-
making. Moreover, the Court's decisions also seem to violate the
Supreme Court's own interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
because other evidence of Supreme Court racial attitudes indicates
that the Court is engaged in intentional racial discrimination.
Although the Supreme Court may be violating the spirit of its
own antidiscrimination laws, the Court is effectively immune from the
commands of both statutes and constitutional provisions. Because the
Court decides what the law is, the Court can always expound the law
in a way that permits the Court to do whatever the Court is doing.
This unique position makes the Supreme Court the ideal social insti-
tution to trade off minority interests for majority gain. In pronounc-
ing the need for nondiscriminatory societal behavior, the Court can
engage in the very discrimination that the Court denounces, thereby
permitting the majority to have its cake and eat it too.
The Supreme Court has served this veiled majoritarian function
since the Republic began. Dred Scott illustrates the minority exploita-
tion phenomenon explicitly; Pessy demonstrates that the Court will
camouflage its exploitation when blatant exploitation becomes un-
palatable; and Brown demonstrates that, when necessary, the camou-
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fiage can become so subtle and elaborate that even minorities may fail
to detect the depths of their own exploitation.
Notwithstanding these observations, the thing that is most strik-
ing about the tradition of Supreme Court racial discrimination is its
utter irrelevance. Whether one focuses on the technicalities of stand-
ing or the merits of civil rights decisions, everyone undoubtedly recog-
nizes that the Court's racial attitudes have had a significant impact on
the Court's race-related decisions. But no one seems to care. North-
eastern Florida is written as if the case were about injury, redressability,
and causation, rather than about the Supreme Court's perpetuation
of racial subordination, and we are eager to accept the charade. This
is like arguing that Dred Scott was about property rights, or that Plessy
was about deference to the legislature. However, the condemnation
that has come to characterize those earlier decision has yet to taint
Northeastern Florida. We continue to discuss and even conceptualize
issues of contemporary racial justice as if the reality of their opera-
tional existence corresponded to the doctrinal formality that those is-
sues are accorded by courts.
This transposition of race, from operational reality to doctrinal
formality, is a necessary incident of Supreme Court adjudication.
Courts cannot confront real life. They can only confront cold records
that have been filtered through evidentiary rules and legal presump-
tions. However, the slippage that occurs between operational exis-
tence and doctrinal formality is sufficient to permit a culture that
subsists on racial subordination to conceive of itself as racially just.
Supreme Court adjudication is instrumental in this process because it
institutionalizes the distractions that are necessary to make a benign
account of our racial difficulties plausible.
When the Supreme Court, therefore, holds that whites have
standing to challenge racial equality, but that minorities lack standing
to challenge racial discrimination, the Court is merely playing out the
social role that we have prescribed for it. The Supreme Court is con-
tinuing to perform the function that it has performed so admirably
throughout its history.
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